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ABSTRACT
Millions of workers in the United States, disproportionatelywomen,
immigrants, andpeople of color, perform low-paid, precariouswork. Few of
these workers can improve their workplace standards because the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") does not sufficiently protect their right to
form unions and collectively bargain. Lacking sufficient influence in federal
and state government to strengthen labor and employment law, unions and
worker centers have increasinglysought to buildpower in cities. The shift to
local labor lawmaking has delivered local minimum wage, paid sick leave,
andfair scheduling ordinances covering millions of low-wage workers, as
well as groundbreaking unionization and collective bargaining agreements,
including in regions of the United States historically hostile to unions. This
has positionedcities as a primary staging groundfor laborlaw reform.
This Article examines this trend as a rejuvenated labor localism and
this trend's effects on state and local government law and labor and
employment law. Labor localism advances the democratic values of labor
and local law by channelingworker and community protests and bargaining
through the direct democracy mechanisms ofcities, instead of or in addition
to the NLRA. While provoking fierce employer campaigns seeking state
preemption of local lawmaking, laborlocalism can often manage these statelocal conflicts by engaging in state law reform and pivoting to adjacent
areas. Modest home rule reform can improve its stability and reach and,
contrary to conventional wisdom, improve local accountability. Labor
localism, finally, reveals the central roles of localism in enabling a bottomup reform effort to counteract the weaknesses offederal labor law and in
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safeguarding democratic norms in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is in an era of historic and deepening economic
inequality,' with employment standards that rank near the bottom of
democratic, industrialized nations. 2 Workers earning the minimum wage
1. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality in America:
Evidence from Distributional Macroeconomic Accounts, 34 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 13, 24 (2020); LARRY
M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 7-16 (2d ed.
2016); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS:
UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 72-76 (2012).
2.
The International Trade Union Confederation ("ITUC") ranked the United States last among
the G7 in its 2021 Global Rights Index. INT'L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, 2021 ITUC GLOBAL
RIGHTS INDEX 12-15 (2021), https://files.mutualcdn.com/ituc/files/ITUC_GlobalRightslndex_2021_
ENFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/6wU2-U23X].
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often work in poverty. 3 The United States is the only industrialized
democracy in the world that does not require paid leave for sickness,
pregnancy, or child care. 4 Weak labor and employment laws have made work
more uncertain, low paying, and unsafe, especially for people of color,
immigrants, and women. 5
The lack of worker power and the decline of unions as a significant
economic and political actor in the United States are important drivers of
income inequality and low workplace standards.6 Union membership has
fallen to its lowest levels since the 1930s.7 This is, at least in part, because
of features of labor law that make it difficult for employees to join and
bargain effectively in unions.8 The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 9
excludes millions of low-wage workers in the United States from its
protections' 0 and permits employers to respond aggressively to union
protests and demands. 1 A primary benefit of labor law for unions is that
unions with majority support can serve as the exclusive representatives of
employees in a bargaining unit. 12 But exclusivity has been seriously
weakened by state "right to work" laws that prohibit unions from requiring
3
payment for the costs of union representation.
3.
About twenty percent of working families with a worker earning the federal minimum wage
live in poverty. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., LOW-WAGE WORKERS: POVERTY AND USE OF
SELECTED FEDERAL SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAMS PERSIST AMONG WORKING FAMILIES (2017),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687314.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N78-NK77].
Gretchen Livingston & Deja Thomas, Among 41 Countries, Only U.S. Lacks Paid Parental
4.
Leave, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/16/u-s-lacksmandated-paid-parental-leave [https://perma.cc/G5EA-SE38].
5.
U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., A PROFILE OF THE WORKING POOR, 2017, at 3-4 (2019),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/working-poor/2017/pdf/home.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8VR-AJCD].
6.
See Henry S. Farber, Daniel Herbst, Ilyana Kuziemko & Suresh Naidu, Unions and Inequality
over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data, 136 Q.J. ECON. 1325, 1355-57 (2021);
Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, Declining Worker Power and American Economic
Performance, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2020, at 9-10 (attributing stagnant wages
to a decline in worker power).
Currently, only 10.8% of U.S. workers belong to a union, just over half of the rate in 1983, and
7.
only 6.3% of the private-sector workforce. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., UNION MEMBERS-2020, at 12 (2021), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2J9-3P5Q].
8.
JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 89 (2014); see also JULIUS G. GETMAN,
THE SUPREME COURT ON UNIONS: WHY LABOR LAW IS FAILING AMERICAN WORKERS 197-98 (2016).

9.

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

§§

151-169.

10.
The NLRA excludes independent contractors, agricultural workers, and domestic workers
from its definition of "employee." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); see also Ruth Milkman, Immigrant Workers and
the Future ofAmerican Labor, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 295, 304 (2011) (finding that these exclusions
take millions of low-wage workers out of coverage of the Act); Michael M. Oswalt, Alt-Bargaining, 82
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 98 (2019).
See infra Part I.
11.

§ 159(a).

12.

29 U.S.C.

13.

The NLRA permits states to enact laws that provide a right to private-sector employees to

refrain from membership. 29 U.S.C.

§ 164(b).
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With the historic decline of labor unions, scholars have searched for
what can replace the loss of workplace and political power. Kate Andrias
proposes a resurgence of sectoral bargaining in which unions are "political
actors representing workers generally," bargaining with employers and the
state for work standards.14 Another related, recent literature considers "altlabor," or strategies to improve workplace standards outside of labor law,
especially by worker centers,1 5 to advance the interests of marginalized
workers often excluded from the protections of labor and employment
laws.1 6 A third scholarship examines the "bargaining for the common good"
approach of public teachers' unions joining in protests and collective
bargaining with parents and students against local austerity budgets.' 7
While providing vital theoretical groundwork, these literatures have not
yet accounted for the localism of these strategies.1 8 This Article identifies
14.

Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 10 (2016).

15.
Worker centers are typically not-for-profit, community-based organizations in communities
where precarious work is a primary concern. See JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING
COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM 11-16 (2006). Because they seek to improve workplace
conditions through public pressure campaigns and litigation rather than by seeking exclusive
representation of employees and collective bargaining agreements with employers, they are generally not
considered unions under federal labor law. See Sameer M. Ashar & Catherine L. Fisk, Democratic Norms
and Governance Experimentalism in Worker Centers, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 144-45 (2019);
Kati L. Griffith & Leslie C. Gates, Worker Centers: Labor Policy as a Carrot, Not a Stick, 14 HARV. L.

& POL'Y REV. 601, 606 (2019).
16.

See Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern Economy, 86

FORDHAM L. REV. 1727, 1749 (2018) (examining worker centers that represent freelancers and Uber
drivers); Brishen Rogers, Libertarian Corporatism Is Not an Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1623, 1631

(2016) (describing "alt-labor" groups representing day laborers and domestic workers); Michael C. Duff,

ALT-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor Organization Bargain, 63 CAT H. U. L. REV. 837,
837 (2014) (offering "[p]rotests against Wal-Mart, strikes against fast food restaurants, and immigration
rallies by unauthorized workers" as examples); Oswalt, supra note 10, at 96 (defining alt-labor as
referring to "organizing efforts aimed at improving working conditions primarily through avenues other

than collective bargaining").
17.
See Oswalt, supra note 10, at 90; Joseph A. McCartin, Marilyn Sneiderman & Maurice BPWeeks, Combustible Convergence: Bargainingfor the Common Good and the #RedforEd Uprisings of

2018, 45 LAB. STUD. J. 97, 105-08 (2020); Joseph A. McCartin, Innovative Union Strategies and the
Struggle to Reinvent Collective Bargaining, in NO ONE SIZE FITS ALL 173-77 (Janice Fine, Linda
Burnham, Kati Griffith, Minsun Ji, Victor Narro & Steven Pitts eds., 2018).
18.
By localism, I refer to the legal and political structures of local governments and their use by
and effects on local residents. It is a bottom-up view of federal, state, and local laws, with an emphasis
on local government and local communities. See Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration
Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2008). Urban and labor studies scholars over the past decade
have examined the local character of many labor-community coalitions. See, e.g., Ian Thomas
MacDonald, The Urbanization of Union Strategy and Struggle, in UNIONS AND THE CITY: NEGOTIATING
URBAN CHANGE 2-17 (Ian Thomas MacDonald ed., 2017); Miriam Greenberg & Penny Lewis, From the
Factory to the City and Back Again, in THE CITY IS THE FACTORY: NEW SOLIDARITIES AND SPATIAL
STRATEGIES IN AN URBAN AGE 12 (Miriam Greenberg & Penny Lewis eds., 2017); Ruth Milkman,
Toward a New Labor Movement? Organizing New York City's Precariat, in NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK:
PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 1-22 (Ruth Milkman & Ed Ott
eds., 2014); Ruth Milkman, Introduction, in WORKING FOR JUSTICE: THE L.A. MODEL OF ORGANIZING
AND ADVOCACY 1-19 (Ruth Milkman, Joshua Bloom & Victor Narro eds., 2010). My focus is the
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the channeling of social movement energy by unions, worker centers, and
allied organizations into city-based strategies to strengthen and lift
workplace standards, using local law instead of or in addition to federal labor
19
law, as "labor localism," and examines its effects on labor and local law.
To be sure, these strategies germinated from decades of experimentation by
progressive local unions and worker centers to expand the power of workers
in cities. 2 0 But recent coalitions of tightly networked unions and worker
centers have intensified their focus on local labor lawmaking, broadening
and deepening its impact. Fueled by social movement energy, unions, worker
centers, and allied community organizations have pooled resources across
tightly networked local labor-community coalitions to fashion a political
economy in cities that favors labor policy experimentation. By positioning
local government as a primary site of workplace regulation, they have
delivered sweeping unionization and collective bargaining agreements, and
hundreds of ordinances requiring local living wage and minimum wages,
paid sick leave, "ban the box" fair hiring, and fair scheduling mandates
across scores of local jurisdictions, collectively covering millions of
workers. 21 This explosion in local lawmaking, including in regions of the
United States historically hostile to the labor movement, has positioned cities
as a primary staging ground for labor law reform.
Accounting for the transformation of local law as a primary site for
labor policy contestation has important implications for city power and statelocal conflicts over economic rights. Many cities have broad initiative power
to regulate the workplace, often without requiring special federal or state
authorization despite their formally subordinate stature. Local labor
lawmaking, however, has ignited fierce state-local conflict. Employer groups
have challenged local labor lawmaking as impliedly preempted by state
employment laws and sought to block labor localism with sweeping forms
of state preemption of local economic regulation. This has limited the
political opportunities, and power, of labor-community coalitions. Recent
local government scholarship offers a pessimistic assessment of the future of
localism in the face of state preemption. 2 2 While state preemption is a
implications of localism for city power and state-local conflict, and its effects on labor law and local law.
19.
By "local law," I refer both to "the portion of state law that is specifically designed to define
the powers of cities," as well as lawmaking by local governments. GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON,
CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 3 (2008); see also RICHARD C. SCHRAGGER,
CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 139-61 (2016).
Progressive unions and labor activists have since the 1960s allied with community groups to
20.
connect "workplace issues with social justice issues extending beyond the traditional realm of work law."

Marion Crain & Kenneth Matheny, The 'New' Labor Regime, 126 YALE L.J. F. 478, 479-80 (2017); see
also VANESSA TAIT, POOR WORKERS' UNIONS: REBUILD[NG LABOR FROM BELOW 218-23 (2005).
See infra Part II.
21.
See Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1997
22.
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genuine threat to local lawmaking, however, a close examination of labor
localism provides some cause for optimism. Channeling protest and
bargaining into city power has reoriented cities to defend local labor
lawmaking in state-local conflict and has provoked labor-community
coalitions to overcome the preemption threat by scaling up to state
lawmaking. This account suggests that local labor-community coalitions can
manage state preemption by engaging with both cities and states in these
state-local conflicts and by seeking modest home rule reform to protect the
stability and reach of labor localism. 2 3
A rejuvenated labor localism also has important effects on labor and
employment law. It permits the reawakening of mass protests, including
those that might otherwise be unprotected or unlawful under the NLRA.
Connecting strikes and other protests by local labor-community coalitions to
translocal labor policy experimentation expands protections against
employer retaliation and remedies for violations. Participation by unions and
worker centers in the direct democracy mechanisms of local government to
bargain for and enforce workplace standards can provide a form of worker
representation to unions and worker centers outside the NLRA while also
improving workplace regulation that relies on' worker participation.
Centering matters of local economic inequality enables subordinated groups,
especially poor people, women, immigrants, and people of color, to exercise
power in dynamic, inclusive protests and forms of bargaining that can
advance democratic values in labor and local law. 24
This Article's account of how labor-community coalitions have broadly
advanced workplace standards and facilitated unionization and collective
bargaining through local law builds on labor law scholarship that examines
local law strategies by unions and worker centers,2 ' and the democratic value
(2018); Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 GEO.
L.J. 1469, 1486 (2018); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163,
1227 (2018).
23. See infra Sections II.B-C.
24. See infra Part III.
25.

See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Michael M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic Democracy in the

Battle over Wal-Mart, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1502 (2008). It builds especially from the work of Scott
Cummings, who has comprehensively examined local labor lawmaking in Los Angeles. See SCOTT L.
CUMMINGS, BLUE AND GREEN: THE DRIVE FOR JUSTICE AT AMERICA'S PORT 17-25 (2018) [hereinafter
BLUE AND GREEN]; SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, AN EQUAL PLACE: LAWYERS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LoS
ANGELES 4-8 (2021) [hereinafter EQUAL PLACE]; Scott L. Cummings & Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing
Local Government Law for Low-Wage Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 187, 221-45. Benjamin Sachs
has discussed the role of local governments in facilitating private-sector collective bargaining with
government actions unrelated to labor law, driving local law into opaque areas to promote collective
bargaining despite National Labor Relations Act preemption. Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption:
Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1164-69 (2011). While local
lawmaking can lack accountability, I draw attention to recent, transparent forms of local labor lawmaking
and collective bargaining as a new form of localism.
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of public sector unions. 2 6 While scholarship about subfederal workplace
regulation has focused on federal law preemption, 27 few labor scholars have
considered state preemption, 2 8 and this Article is the first to assess the recent
calls for home rule reform to protect local labor lawmaking. 2 9 This Article
also contributes to scholarship about the social movement transformation of
law. 30 Its thick description of local legislative campaigns by translocal,
federated networks of unions and worker centers offers an important
example of the organizational strategies and structures developed by the
labor movement to build and sustain workplace and political power. 31
26.
See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective BargainingDistortDemocracy?
A Perspectivefrom the United States, 34 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 277, 305 (2013). Scholarship about
public sector employees has most recently focused on police union opposition to officer accountability
for, and citizen oversight to deter, police racism and violence. See Benjamin Levin, What's Wrong with

Police Unions?, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1333, 1388 (2020); Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police
Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 779-80 (2017); infra Section II.C and notes 141, 234.
27.
See Fisk & Oswalt, supra note 25, at 1526-27 (assessing impact of Employee Retirement
Income Security Act preemption on alt-labor Wal-Mart site fight); BLUE AND GREEN, supranote 25, at
188-99 (evaluating labor-community coalition response to Federal Aviation and Administration
Authorization Act preemption challenge to port regulation of truck drivers); Sachs, supra note 25, at
1164-69 (discussing NLRA preemption in local labor lawmaking); Andrias, supra note 14, at 90-93

(focusing on NLRA preemption).
Frug and Barron diagnose that "the most significant restrictions on local power in the United
28.
States come from state governments, not the national government." FRUG & BARRON, supra note 19, at
44; see also Andrias, supranote 14, at 90. Olatunde Johnson examines the benefits and risks of advancing
local legislation for labor and civil rights groups in light of state preemption. She argues that given the
"well-funded deregulatory effort" by employer groups to preempt local lawmaking, that state-level
reform will be necessary to protect it. Olatunde C. A. Johnson, The Future of Labor Localism in an Age
of Preemption,74 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 1179, 1196 (2021). I share this concern and offer state home
rule reform to address state preemption abuse. This Article's account of labor-community coalitions
scaling up to overcome employer-sponsored state preemption offers a more optimistic assessment of the
ability of labor localism to overcome the state preemption threat. See infra Sections II.B-C.
The National League of Cities proposes a Model Constitutional Home Rule Article that would
29.
significantly limit state preemption of local lawmaking. NAT'L LEAGUE OF CITIES, PRINCIPLES OF HOME
RULE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2020), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Home-RulePrinciples-ReportWEB-2-l.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL9T-9ZQ9] [hereinafter "NLC Report"]; see also

David Schleicher, ConstitutionalLaw for NIMBYs: A Review of "Principlesof Home Rule for the 21st
Century" by the National League of Cities, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 921-22 (2020) (offering a critical
assessment of the NLC Report proposals).
See Amna A. Akbar, Sameer M. Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73 STAN. L.
30.
REV. 821, 825 (2021) (calling for legal scholars to examine "today's left social movements, their
imaginations, experiments, tactics, and strategies for legal and social change"); Lani Guinier & Gerald
Torres, Changingthe Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE
L.J. 2740, 2752 (2014) (inviting inquiries that produce a "democratic understanding of how power
functions in representational relationships"). As with the labor movement more broadly, the examples of
labor localism in this Article satisfy Charles Tilly's definition of a social movement as a repeated,
collective, and sustained challenge to power holders by people living within the jurisdiction of the power
holders. See Charles Tilly, From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements, in HOW SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS MATTER 253, 257 (Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam & Charles Tilly eds., 1999); see also
Catherine L. Fisk & Diana S. Reddy, Protectionby Law, Repression by Law: BringingLabor Back into
the Study of Law and Social Movements, 70 EMORY L.J. 63, 74 (2020) ("The definition of a social
movement should be broad enough to encompass working-class people's collective defiance of workplace
authoritarianism to seek redistribution of both wealth and power.").
31. See K. SABEEL RAHMAN & HOLLIE RUSSON GILMAN, CIVIC POWER: REBUILDING AMERICAN

260

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:253

While recent local law scholarship seeks to engage with adjacent
areas,32 labor law is a muted area of concern among local law scholars. 33
This is surprising given that labor law and local law raise similar questions
about democracy 34 and the allocation of power to prevent domination. 35 This
Article contributes to the recent debate about home rule reform by offering
localism as vital to advance the democratic values underlying labor and local
law. Public participation in local government is also a form of local
accountability that can be more effective than state supervision, 36 which can
strengthen and lift workplace standards. 37 These benefits suggest durable
roles for localism in reforming labor law and safeguarding democratic
norms, despite the inarguably broader coverage and preemptive power of
federal and state government.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the current weaknesses
of labor and employment law in the United States as attributable to the lack
of political influence of the nonaffluent in federal and state government. It
will introduce the shift of labor-community coalitions to local government
to advance labor lawmaking as a form of decentralized, direct democracy.
Part II first explores the effects of labor-community coalitions channeling
social movement energy into local protest and lawmaking. This has pushed
labor-community coalitions to become broader and more inclusive, and to
DEMOCRACY IN AN ERA OF CRISIS 58-59 (2019) (arguing that social movements require "organizational
strategies, structures, and resources of social movement organizations" to influence democratic politics);
Fisk & Reddy, supra note 30, at 128 (describing the institutionalization of unions as both "Achilles' heel"
and "a source of power").

32.

See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 111 (2013) (discussing local

law and firearm regulation); Su, supra note 18, at 1629 (discussing local law and immigration law).

33.

Local law scholars Richard Schragger and David Barron both examine early forms of local

labor lawmaking in the 1990s and 2000s in ways that are aligned with this Article's account of labor
localism as translocal. See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the

Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 528-29 (2009); David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116
HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2341 (2003).
34.
See Andrias, supra note 14, at 77 (arguing that unions can be "an important training ground
for political democracy"); GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS 10-12 (1999) (explaining that decentralized, local power offers a participatory forum
that enhances democracy).
35.
K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 88-91 (2017); GUY DAVIDOV, A
PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO LABOUR LAW 35, 38-40 (2016) (stating that labor law addresses employer
domination of employees by correcting the "democratic deficit" in workplaces); Brishen Rogers,

Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL'YREV. 479,
500 (2016); PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF
DEMOCRACY 110-15 (2012); FRUG, supra note 34, at 58.
36.
See infra Section II.C.
37.
Recent local law scholarship about the economic effects of local regulation has primarily
engaged with agglomeration economics or the beneficial network effects of cities. See David Schleicher,

Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 101-02 (2017); Schragger,
supra note 33, at 521. It has not yet engaged with economics literature finding that local wage mandates
are not exclusionary and can reduce the harmful effects of employer buyer market (or monopsony) power
for workers. See infra Section III.B; ERIC A. POSNER, HOW ANTITRUST FAILED WORKERS 27-28 (2021).

2021 ]

LABOR'S NEW LOCALISM

26 1

advance local lawmaking translocally, or across local jurisdictions. It then
considers the rise of state preemption as a threat to local labor lawmaking. It
finds that labor-community coalitions have often managed this threat by
engaging in state-level lawmaking and pivoting to adjacent areas. It assesses
the current debate about home rule reform, concluding that labor localism
advances democratic values and can improve local accountability, and
requires only modest home rule reform to improve its stability and reach.
Part III demonstrates how labor localism can counteract longstanding
weaknesses in labor law and advance democratic values in labor and local
law, without harming the institutional strength of unions or encouraging
capital flight. Part IV assesses the value of a decentralized approach to labor
and employment law given the primacy and broader reach of federal and
state standards. It concludes that by building and channeling social
movement energy into policy experimentation across cities, labor localism
can revitalize federal labor law and advance the democratic values of labor
and local law.
I. LABOR LOCALISM AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN
FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT
Nearly half of workers report that they lack voice in the workplace and
would join a union if they could. 38 But unions represent only about ten
percent of the United States workforce and a vanishingly small number of
low-wage workers in many sectors. 39 This is because the NLRA excludes
millions of low-wage workers40 and makes it exceedingly difficult for other
workers to join unions and collectively bargain with employers without fear
of reprisal. Private-sector employers often can hire permanent replacements
for strikers, 4 1lock out employees to press a bargaining position, 42 and ignore
union demands to bargain for "non-mandatory" issues, such as employer
decisions to close part of a business. 43 Even if an employer egregiously
violates labor law, the typical remedy is the widely criticized make-whole
38.

Thomas A. Kochan, Duanyi Yang, Willian T. Kimball & Erin L. Kelly, Worker Voice in

America: Is There a Gap Between What Workers Expect and What They Experience?, 72 INDUS. & LAB.
RELS. REV. 3, 20 (2019).
39.
U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., supra note 7, at 8 (showing that 3.5% of restaurant workers and
1.7% of workers in agricultural and related occupations are in a union).
40.
See Milkman, supra note 10, at 304.

41.

NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (permitting employer to hire

permanent replacement for economic strikes, with a right of recall after the strike ends as vacancies

occur).
42.
43.

Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 325 (1965).
First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 672 (1981) (holding that employers may close

departments without having to bargain with unions, although employers must bargain about the effects
of the decision).
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remedy of reinstatement and damages,44 which is unavailable to employees
who lack authorization to work. 45 The duty to mitigate in backpay awards
and administrative delays in reinstating employees fired for union support
often render even these remedies futile. 46
In contrast to the deference federal labor law affords employers, the
NLRA tightly constricts a union's right to protest "secondary" employers 4 7
and imposes far more onerous administrative duties on unions than those
imposed on other entities. 48 As Catherine Fisk and Diana Reddy explain,
these union restrictions can channel unions "into weaker and less disruptive
activities, . . . blunting union activism." 49 States have further weakened
labor law by codifying a "right to work," or the right to refrain from paying
unions for the costs of representation. 50 The Supreme Court
constitutionalized the right to refrain as a First Amendment right in publicsector workplaces in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, Council 31.51
For decades, labor law scholars have called for and the labor movement
sought
federal law reform to address the weaknesses and gaps of the
has
52
NLRA. But labor law reform ultimately depends on political influence to
enact it. Unions have traditionally formed the primary national interest group
in the United States seeking to lift and strengthen workplace standards. 53 The
political economy of the United States, however, is primarily responsive to
44.29 U.S.C. § 151, 152(3), 157. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 14, 23
(2000), https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/u/us/usbr008.pdf [https://perma.cc/463L-VQ2N] (criticizing
"enervating delays and weak remedies [for] invit[ing] continued violations").

45.

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 160 (2002).

46.

Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the

NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1789-93 (1983).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4); see also Hirsch & Seiner, supra note 16, at 1774; Duff, supra note 16,
at 843-45.
48.
The Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 imposes unique reporting requirements and internal
democracy duties on unions. See 29 U.S.C. § 411, 431, 439, 481. Not-for-profit organizations are, by
comparison, lightly regulated. Ashar & Fisk, supra note 15, at 154.

49.

Fisk & Reddy, supra note 30, at 124-25.

50.
Twenty-seven states and Guam have right-to-work laws. Right-to-Work Resources, NAT'L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-

bills.aspx [https://perma.cc/WV6M-543A].
51. Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018).
See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 16, at 1624-25; Benjamin Sachs, Revitalizing Labor Law, 31
52.
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 333, 334-35 (2010). At time of writing, the Biden administration supports
the Protecting the Right to Organize Acts ("PRO Act"), which passed in the United States House of
Representatives in 2020. H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (2020). Before that, the Employee Free Choice Act

("EFCA") passed in the House in 2008 and 2009. See H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009). Both bills have not
passed in the Senate. For a history and explanation of congressional inaction on labor law reform, see

Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1540 (2002).
53.
RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 19 (1984).
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the priorities of the affluent, 54 a trend that has accelerated with the decline of
the labor movement to counterbalance the representational gap in national
and state politics."
This Part will first explain the lack of labor rights in the United States
as driven by a democratic deficit for workers. It will then describe the growth
of local labor lawmaking as a response to this absence of "equality of
voice,"56 through labor-community coalitions that seek to build worker
power through cities.
A. THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AT THE HEART OF WEAK WORKPLACE
RIGHTS

For democratic theorists, a democratic polity requires political systems
that encourage the broad participation of society in decision-making over
matters of everyday life. 57 Democratic reformers beginning in the
Progressive Era have understood the importance of civic participation in
democratic institutions, with unions as potential training grounds for
democracy. 58 As K. Sabeel Rahman cautions, Progressive Era reformers did
not attend, however, to the "the challenges of activating and empowering
voices that might normally be marginalized." 59 Political scientists have
consistently found that the affluent have disproportionate influence in
politics. 60 The political inequality favoring the affluent is reflected in interest
organizations lobbying the federal government. 6 1 With its dwindling
membership and waning resources, labor unions cannot match the influence
of the business lobby, particularly in securing economic rights such as labor
MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE & INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER
54.
IN AMERICA 5 (2012); Bartels, supra note 1, at 4, 113-17.
BARTELS, supra note 1, at 133-35; LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING:
55.
HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 13 (2015);
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 322-24.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
56.
57.
CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 34-35 (1970) (discussing
importance of public participation in local government and workplace in political theories of John Stuart

Mill and G.D.H. Cole).
58.
In G.D.H. Cole's view, workplace governance advances democracy because regular people are
involved to the greatest extent in relationships and spend the most time at work. Id. at 38. Louis Brandeis
"emphasized the importance of citizen mobilization through trade unions and other groups as a form of
countervailing power against monopolies and corporations," RAHMAN, supra note 35, at 102; see also
THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVIC
LIFE 85, 105-07, 111 (2003).
59.
RAHMAN, supra note 35, at 108.
GILENS, supra note 54, at 160; BARTELS, supra note 1, at 243 (suggesting that opinions of low60.
income constituents are "of little or no consequence" to federal legislators); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra
note 1, at 8 (finding that political influence ascends up the income ladder).
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 322-24; DRUTMAN, supra note 55, at 8, 13.
61.
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law reform. 62
And while there is little evidence that interest groups can advance major
federal legislation, 63 they can block federal policies they oppose. 64 This
entrenches a pro-business tilt and status quo bias in federal policymaking in
ways that can lack transparency. 65 The weakened state of unions and the
dominance of the business lobby help to explain why there has been no
significant change to federal labor law in over fifty years and to employment
law since the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.66 Even the federal
minimum wage has remained fixed at $7.25 an hour for over a decade, the
longest period without change since the Fair Labor Standards Act was
enacted in 1938.67
While the success of the business lobby at the federal level has primarily
been in preventing legislative reform, the pro-business lobby has radically
transformed state law over the past decade. Forming an alliance with
business groups and conservative donors through the American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC), movement conservatives have successfully
lobbied for uniform, pro-business lawmaking throughout the states, 6 8
enabled by opaque state governments 69 and inexperienced, underfunded
legislators. 70 ALEC pioneered a form of "functional entrenchment," 7 1 or the
62.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 87-88. As union membership has declined, the share of
interest groups representing poor people, and the political activity of people in the bottom half of the
income scale, have declined as well. Id. at 357, 361; see also GILENS, supranote 54, at 158.
63.
The Trump Administration did make radical changes to labor law through NLRB rulemaking
and administrative decisions. See, e.g., Joint Employer Status Under the National Labor Relations Act,

85 Fed. Reg. 11,184, 11,187, 11,198 (Feb. 26, 2020) (reversing Browning-Ferrisand narrowly construing
joint employer liability); SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (2019) (expanding interpretation
of "independent contractor" to include most platform economy workers, such as Uber and Lyft drivers);

Walmart Stores, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (2019) (broadening the employer right to fire workers who
participate in a series of work stoppages). These changes, however, are likely a temporary swing that will
be reversed by the current Board. See Ian Kullgren, New NLRB Chair Gives Roadmap for Possible
Actions Under Biden, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Feb. 24, 2021, 1:51 PM), https://news.
bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/new-nlrb-chair-gives-roadmap-for-possible-actions-under-biden

[https://perma.cc/5G8A-5J9H].
64.
65.

GILENS, supranote 54, at 133.
DRUTMAN, supra note 55, at 26-27; SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 298.

66.

29 U.S.C.

§ 2601.

67.
29 U.S.C. § 201. At time of writing, a proposal by the Biden Administration to raise the federal
minimum wage to $15 an hour failed in the Senate. Emily Cochrane & Catie Edmondson, Minimum Wage
IncreaseFails as 7 Democrats Vote Against the Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.ny
times.com/2021/03/05/us/minimum-wage-senate.html [https://perma.cc/F92T-7MBP].
68.
ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, STATE CAPTURE: HOW CONSERVATIVE ACTIVISTS, BIG
BUSINESSES, AND WEALTHY DONORS RESHAPED THE AMERICAN STATES-AND THE NATION 1-14, 34-

55 (2019).
69.

Miriam Seifter, Furtherfrom the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L.

REV. 107, 130-34 (2018).
70. HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 68, at 9-11.
71.

Daryl Levinson & Benjamin 1. Sachs, PoliticalEntrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J.
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undermining of political opposition by using law other than election lawin this case, labor law. 72 A chief accomplishment of ALEC has been a
national campaign for states to enact right-to-work laws in order to disable
public sector unions, a key constituent of the Democratic Party. 73 The most
high-profile example of these laws was enacted in Wisconsin in 2011,
causing state public sector union membership in that state to steeply decline
from fifty percent to under twenty percent by 2017.74 Hobbling unions in
these states led to a parallel, successful effort in 2018, with Janus, to hollow
out public-sector unions. 75
In sum, the political economy of labor law reform is shaped by the
dominance of the business lobby over federal and state politics, while unions
have declined as a political counterweight. This has foreclosed federal
reform, while undermining labor unions through state right-to-work laws.
While polls consistently show that the median voter supports labor unions,
raising the minimum wage, and employer-provided paid family and sick
leave,7 6 these 'economic interests are contrary to the interests of the affluent,
and the nonaffluent lack the political influence to advance them.
B. LOCALISM AS LABOR'S RESPONSE TO THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT

Labor law exclusions and rules permitting aggressive employer
responses to union elections have foreclosed unionization for many and have
eroded the ability of those workers in unions to engage in effective collective
bargaining or political advocacy. As Benjamin Sachs argues, blocking off a
meaningful pathway for many workers to join unions and collectively
bargain has the hydraulic effect of "forc[ing] open alternative legal
channels." 77 One such hydraulic is to push labor unions, often in coalition
400, 402-03 (2015).
72. Id. at 403.
73.

HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 68, at 178-88.

74.

Id. at 190.

75.

Since Janus, public sector unions have lost over 100,000 members. Ian Kullgren & Aaron

Kessler, Unions Fend Off Membership Exodus in 2 Years Since Janus Ruling, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY
LAB. REP. (June 26, 2020, 3:15 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/unions-fendoff-membership-exodus-in-2-years-since-janus-ruling [https://perma.cc/SD9U-QY4Z].
See Megan Brenan, At 65%, Approval of Labor Unions in U.S. Remains High, GALLUP (Sept.
76.
3, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/318980/approval-labor-unions-remains-high.aspx [https://perma.
cc/4J9J-ZGGD] (reporting that sixty-five percent of the public supports unions, as high as any point since
the 1960s); Leslie Davis & Hannah Hartig, Two-Thirds ofAmericans Favor Raising FederalMinimum
Wage to $15 an Hour, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 30, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact[https://
tank/2019/07/30/two-thirds-of-americans-favor-raising-federal-minimum-wage-to-l5-an-hour
perma.cc/9WJZ-VJHT]; Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Kim Parker, Nikki Graf & Gretchen Livingston,
Americans Widely Support PaidFamily and MedicalLeave, but Differ Over Specific Policies,PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/03/23/americans-widely-support-paidfamily-and-medical-leave-but-differ-over-specific-policies [https://perma.cc/E49U-AS5P].

77.

Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZo L. REv. 2685, 2687 (2008).
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with worker centers and other community organizations, toward localism.
Here, "labor localism" refers to a channeling of social movement activism
by unions and worker centers into local government to improve workplace
standards, using local law instead of or in addition to federal labor law. 7 8
Democratic reformers since the Progressive Era have viewed localism
as a response to the democratic deficit in federal and state politics.7 9 To
counteract barriers to group mobilization that can reinforce the biases that
favor the political influence of the affluent, democratic theorist Robert Dahl
proposes a decentralized version of pluralism. 80 Decentralized pluralism
"provide[s] a high probability that any active and legitimate group will make
itself heard effectively at some stage in the process of decision." 81 As Gerald
Frug explains, this can advance the community-building value of local
government with democratic participation, public policy experimentation,
and "the energy derived from democratic forms of organization." 82
Unions and community groups have experimented with local economic
self-governance and local labor lawmaking since the Progressive Era. 83
Cities have long been influential in promoting labor peace agreements
among employees and employers on municipal property, in public projects,
78.
BLUE AND GREEN, supra note 25, at 342. Professor Johnson uses the term "labor localism" to
refer to state and local lawmaking sought by labor and civil rights groups. See Johnson, supra note 28, at
1179-80. While the definitions are similar, I use the term to focus on local workplace protections that can
facilitate unionization, and on collective bargaining by local public sector unions.
79.
G.D.H. Cole "argued that it was only by participation at the local level and in local associations
that the individual could 'learn democracy,' " PATEMAN, supra note 57, at 38, and for John Dewey, local
government permits "citizens to contest political elites and participate in the ongoing and day-to-day
routines of policy and politics," RAHMAN, supra note 35, at 102-05. To be sure, local law during this
period was also a source of repression and social control of poor people, immigrants, and people of color.

See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv.' 1057, 1107-08 (1980). But
progressive reformers "saw the city as a fully political, social enterprise," and sought home rule to protect
local services from privatization and private control. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 19, at 38.
80.
PATEMAN, supra note 57, at 8; see also ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 133 (1956); 1 JOSHUA COHEN & JOEL ROGERS, ASSOCIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY: THE REAL
UTOPIAS PROJECT 33 (Erik Olin Wright ed., 1995).
81.
DAHL, supra note 80, at 150.
82.
FRUG, supra note 34, at 10.
83.
During the Progressive Era, small businesses and craft workers resisted national political and
economic domination in cities through local self-governance and protective local legislation. ANDREW
WENDER COHEN, THE RACKETEER'S PROGRESS: CHICAGO AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MODERN
AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1900-1940, at 1-10 (2004). One modem predecessor of the current labor localism
was the "community stewards program" developed by a Teamsters local in St. Louis in the 1950s and
1960s, which engaged itsmembers to exercise power in the workplace and in local government "as
citizens concerned with broader community interests." ROBERT BUSSEL, FIGHTING FOR TOTAL PERSON
UNIONISM: HAROLD GIBBONS, ERNEST CALLOWAY, AND WORKING-CLASS CITIZENSHIP 4, 85-101
(2015). It established a "community bargaining table" to bargain for improved access to city services,
and, in a coalition with the NAACP, it blocked a city charter revision in 1957 that would have imposed a
regressive income tax on residents and secured agreements with national employers to hire African

Americans in racially segregated occupations. Id. at 93-110.
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and in heavily regulated spaces. 84 Local government is also a major
employer of union members, 85 an area in which local government has
undisputed authority.86
These trends have gathered force since the 1980s, as progressive union
locals centered cities as a site to lift workplace standards and to facilitate
unionization and collective bargaining. 87 The Service Employees
International Union's ("SEIU") Justice for Janitors campaign beginning in
the late 1980s successfully pressured building owners and cleaning
contractors in urban commercial regions to recognize and bargain with
unions through community protests that garnered local public support.8 8
During the same period, antipoverty organizations and immigrant rights
groups established worker centers to address workplace issues in lowincome neighborhoods, especially in immigrant communities. 89 Local laborcommunity coalitions in the 1990s and 2000s launched living wage
campaigns and similar political mobilization strategies to raise workplace
standards and facilitate unionization through local legislation. 90
A rejuvenated labor localism emerged from this experimentation,
propelled by two key developments. First, worker centers over the past
decade developed into national, translocal federations, like unions. This
84.

BLUE AND GREEN, supra note 25, at 6, 57-58; see also Airline Serv. Providers Ass'n v. L.A.

World Airports, 873 F.3d 1074, 1084 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that a city acts as market participant and is
not preempted under NLRA in requiring employers in the airport they operate to agree to voluntary
recognition agreements with unions); Associated Builders & Contractors v. City of Lansing, 880 N.W.2d

765, 769-70 (Mich. 2016).

Local public-sector employees are exempt from federal labor law, but by the 1980s, most states
85.
enacted public-sector collective bargaining statutes. Local employees have since become a large and
stable source of union membership in the United States. Patrick Flavin & Michael T. Hartney, When

Government Subsidizes Its Own: Collective Bargaining Laws as Agents of PoliticalMobilization, 59 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 896, 898 (2015).
86.
Local government has significant autonomy to shape employee hiring and collective
bargaining rules. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2-Remedying the Urban
Disadvantage Through Federalism and Localism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2017).
See Oswalt, supra note 10, at 89, 95-96; TAIT, supra note 20, at 187-88; Mamie Brady, An
87.
Appetite for Justice: The Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York, in NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK:
PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT, supra note 18, at 229.

88.

Christopher L. Erickson, Catherine L. Fisk, Ruth Milkman, Daniel J. B. Mitchell & Kent

Wong, Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles: Lessons from Three Rounds of Negotiations, 40 BRIT. J.

INDUS. RELS. 543, 547-56 (2002); Roger Waldinger, Chris Erickson, Ruth Milkman, Daniel J. B.
Mitchell, Abel valenzuela, Kent Wong & Maurice Zeitlin, Helots No More: A Case Study of the Justice
for JanitorsCampaign in Los Angeles, in ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES
104-05, 114 (Kate Bronfenbrenner, Sheldon Friedman, Richard W. Hurd, Rudolph A. Oswald & Ronald

L. Seeber eds., 1998).
89.

See, e.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS

67-111, 185-218, 299 (2005).
90.
EQUAL PLACE, supra note 25, at 263-310; Cummings & Boutcher, supra note 25, at 192-93.
A similar strategy developed during this time, site fights, uses local law to prevent large retailers from
undercutting local workplace standards. Fisk & Oswalt, supra note 25, at 1506-07, 1521.
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fueled the growth of local affiliate groups, including in regions of the United
States historically hostile to the labor movement.9 1 Second, as the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO")
came to embrace local worker centers and local strategies to improve
workplace standards for all, 92 local unions developed networked, translocal
coalitions with worker centers. 93 These progressive union locals and worker
centers forged a new localism out of the rich array of local policy tools to
regulate the workplace.
To be sure, local labor lawmaking and local labor-community coalitions
have been durable features of progressive labor unions for decades, 94 and
both coexist alongside national and statewide campaigns to improve
workplace standards. 95 This Article focuses on recent examples of labor
localism to emphasize its rejuvenation after single-city worker centers
became national federations closely aligned with international unions and
the AFL-CIO. Tracking the growth of other social movements over the past
decade, 96 this galvanized the mass formation of tightly networked, federated
labor-community coalitions, especially in regions where they were
previously absent. Local labor lawmaking has become more ambitious as
According to Janice Fine, in 2006, nearly two-thirds of worker centers were unaffiliated, but
91.
by 2018, almost three-fourths were affiliated with a worker center federation. Six major worker center
federations developed between 2001 and 2012, doubling worker center growth during those years. Janice
Fine, victor Narro & Jacob Barnes, Understanding Worker Center Trajectories, in NO ONE SIZE FITS
ALL, supra note 17, at 13-14.

92.

By 2013, then-AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka acknowledged that "our basic system of

workplace representation is failing-failing miserably-to meet the needs of America's workers by every
critical measure" and urged unions to look beyond federal labor law 'as a matter of survival. Michael
Bologna, Trumka Calls on Labor Movement to Adapt to New Models of Representation,BLOOMBERG L.:
DAILY LAB. REP. (Mar. 6, 2013, 9:00 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/trumkacalls-on-labor-movement-to-adapt-to-new-models-of-representation [https://perma.cc/W7MU-28FV].
93.
The AFL-CIO has since signed partnership agreements with the worker centers National
Domestic Workers Alliance and National Guestworkers Alliance and granted a charter to the New York
Taxi Workers Alliance ("NYTWA") as an AFL-CIO union; NYTWA's executive director joined the
AFL-CIO's executive board. John Herzfeld, AFL-CIO Signs PartnershipAgreements with Groups for
Domestic, Guestworkers, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (May 9, 2011, 9:00PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/afl-cio-signs-partnership-agreements-with-groups-

for-domestic-guestworkers [https://perma.cc/JYN5-TATT].
94.
See, e.g., TAIT, supra note 20, at 163-71.
95.
In the case of #RedforEd, local school reform requires teachers' unions in some states to
campaign for statewide education budget increases. Alex Ebert & Genevieve Douglas, TeachersLeverage
#RedForEd Walkouts to Win Bigger Pay Boosts, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Jan. 21, 2020, 3:15
AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/teachers-leverage-redfored-walkouts-to-win-

bigger-pay-boosts [https://perma.cc/3LVY-6ZNV]. The National Domestic Worker Alliance ("NDWA").
pioneered its first domestic worker bill of rights in New York State, which became a model for umbrella

groups of local affiliates in other states. See Hina B. Shah, Notesfrom the Field: The Role of the Lawyer
in GrassrootsPolicyAdvocacy, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 393, 405-06 (2015).
96. Akbar et al., supra note 30, at 824-25 (charting the rise over the past decade of Occupy Wall
Street, Movement for Black Lives, Green New Deal, and protests and organizing by "nurses, teachers,
and 'rideshare' drivers").
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these groups have developed broad coalitions and refashioned the law and
political economy of cities to extend policy experimentation across local
boundaries.

II. THE NEW LABOR LOCALISM
Local government has become a primary site of labor protest and
bargaining, enabling labor-community coalitions to lift workplace standards
for workers who are often outside the reach of labor law and to facilitate
ground-breaking unionization and collective bargaining agreements. 97
Labor-community coalitions have done this by both building social
movement energy locally-broadly diffused through labor-community
coalitions-and by linking local coalitions nationally, in translocal networks
that reach into regions and sectors historically beyond the reach of the labor
movement.
This Part will first explore the key features of the new labor localism,
translocalism and pluralism, and then assess the employer backlash of state
preemption. It finds that local labor-community coalitions have successfully
navigated state preemption but that modest home rule and other state law
reform can protect the stability and reach of labor localism. It will respond
to criticism that home rule reform will remove local accountability by
offering direct democracy mechanisms in local government as a form of
accountability that can be more effective than state supervision.
A. THE NEW LABOR LOCALISM AS TRANSLOCAL AND PLURALIST

This Section will explain how the new labor localism is increasingly
"translocal" and "pluralist." Here, "translocalism" refers to policy
experimentation across local jurisdictions, to other local (and state)
governments in which there are similar networks of worker centers, unions,
and allied organizations. "Pluralism" refers to the broadening of local protest
and collective bargaining by building solidarity across economically and
politically subordinated groups with overlapping interests.
1. Translocalism
A defining characteristic of the new labor localism is the translocal
structure of its participating unions and worker centers. Unions, locally
rooted but federally coordinated through international unions and labor
This is similar to Kate Andrias's argument that labor lawmaking positions unions as "political
97.
actors" seeking to advance the interests of workers whether or not they are union members. Andrias,
supra note 14, at 8, 10.
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federations, 98 are among the last remaining translocal organizations from the
Progressive Era. 99 Worker centers in the past decade adopted the translocal
federation structure of unions, spurring dramatic worker center growth over
the past decade. 100 Unions and worker centers became increasingly
networked and have pooled resources in local labor-community
coalitions. 10 1The translocal structure of these coalitions has allowed them to
jointly engage in policy experimentation across local jurisdictions.1 02
As local labor lawmaking has become firmly established, its reach has
broadened to include private-sector employers and standards that include
minimum wage, paid sick leave, and secure scheduling ordinances, as well
as "ban the box" ordinances limiting criminal record inquiries in hiring. 103
These campaigns typically begin in relatively pro-labor cities like Chicago,
Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia, and Seattle, and then span out
across local jurisdictions, including in right-to-work states that are
traditionally hostile to unions.1 04 Local government for translocal campaigns
is a staging ground for elaboration of aspirational policies into model
legislation and building popular support across local boundaries and for state
and national expansion.
Fight for Fifteen, a coalition of unions and worker centers led by SEIU,
exemplifies the translocalism of the new labor localism. Its strategy to obtain
a $15 minimum wage and a union has centered on translocal policy
experimentation by a network of locally rooted, labor-community coalitions
across cities. By 2012, SEIU and allied worker centers developed into
coalitions across scores of cities to increase the local and state minimum
98.
Though the roughly 65,000 local unions in the United States are generally quite small, usually
with 200 or fewer employees, most are part of international unions such as the Service Employees

International Unions ("SEIU"). The majority of unions are affiliated with the AFL-CIO. FREEMAN
MEDOFF, supra note 53, at 34-38.

99.
Like other voluntary organizations formed during the Progressive Era, unions have a
translocally federated structure in which national federations develop from dues-paying members in local
chapters. See SKOCPOL, supranote 58, at 85-87.
100.
Fine et al., supra note 91, at 13-14.

101.

The National Day Laborer Organizing Network ("NDLON"), for example, has developed a

partnership with the Laborers' International Union of North American ("LIUNA") to organize the
residential construction sector. Maria Dziembowska, NDLON and the History of Day Laborer
Organizing, in wORKING FOR JUSTICE: THE L.A. MODEL OF ORGANIZING AND ADVOCACY, supra note

18, at 152. In 2006 the AFL-CIO and NDLON agreed to permit NDLON members to affiliate with the
AFL-CIO and coordinate with Central Labor Councils. Id.
102.
See Josh Eidelson, The Lessons Unions Learned from the 'Justice for Janitors' Protests,
BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2015, 2:55 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-16/thelessons-that-unions-leamed-from-thejustice-for-janitors-protests [https://perma.cc/88AZ-KA38).
103.
See Ken Jacobs, Governing the Marketfrom Below: Setting Labor Standards at the State and
Local Levels, in NO ONE SIZE FITS ALL, supra note 17, at 271.
104. See, e.g., BARTELS, supra note 1, at 224 (recounting successful voter referendum in 2004 to
adopt a constitutional amendment in Florida to increase the state minimum wage).
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wage.1 05 The 2013 voter-approved ballot measure in Sea-Tac, Washington
created the first $15 minimum wage mandate in the United States. 10 6 This
led to one-day strikes, culminating in 2015 with the largest protest by lowwage workers in United States history.1 07 By focusing on cities for initial
policy experimentation, Fight for Fifteen developed popular support for
state-wide expansion. In Minnesota, for example, SEIU funded a coalition
called Minnesotans for a Fair Economy ("MFE"), in Minneapolis and St.
Paul. 108 In addition to participating in Fight for Fifteen nationwide strikes,
MFE sought and ultimately persuaded city legislators to enact a paid sick
leave ordinance in Minneapolis in 2016 and a $15 minimum wage ordinance
in St. Paul in 2018.109 When MFE encountered resistance to a $15 minimum
wage ordinance from Minneapolis City councilmembers, it overcame this
opposition by galvanizing public support through a successful voter initiative
enacting the ordinance. 1 0
Translocal labor-community networks have proven remarkably
successful in advancing policy experimentation. By the end of 2021, Fight
for Fifteen will have obtained minimum wage increases in seventy-four
cities, counties, and states, including in regions historically hostile to the
labor movement. 1" Most employees in the United States now live in areas
with a minimum wage higher than the FLSA requires,11 2 and many local
105. Michael M. Oswalt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 630-31 (2016); see
also William Finnegan, Dignity, NEW YORKER (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2014/09/15/dignity-william-finnegan [https://perma.cc/P5CF-FHLB].
106.

DAVID ROLF, THE FIGHT FOR FIFTEEN: THE RIGHT WAGE FOR A WORKING AMERICA 90-164

(2016).
107. Steven Greenhouse & Jana Kasperkevic, Fight for $15 Swells into Largest Protest by LowWage Workers in U.S. History, GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2015, 5:40 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/apr/15/fight-for-i5-minimum-wage-protests-new-york-los-angeles-atlanta-boston

[https://

perma.cc/AXF7-5S9J].
Lucas A. Franco, Organizing the Precariat: The Fight to Build and Sustain Fast Food Worker
108.
Power, 45 CRITICAL SOCIO. 517, 525 (2019).
109. Frederick Melo, St. Paul Approves Eventual Increase to $15 Minimum Wage, DULUTH NEWS
TRIB. (Nov. 14, 2018, 7:45 PM), https://www.duluthnewstribune.com/news/4529421-st-paul-approveseventual-increase-I5-minimum-wage [https://perma.cc/N97E-69LJ].

110. Id.; Brandt Williams, Minneapolis Council Approves $15 an Hour Minimum Wage, MPR
NEWS (June 30, 2017, 7:03 AM), https://www.mpmews.org/story/2017/06/30/minneapolis-councilapproves-15-dollar-minimum-wage [https://perma.cc/ZP8A-HWFR].
111. YANNET LATHROP, RAISES FROM COAST TO COAST IN 2021: WORKERS' WAGES WILL
INCREASE IN 52 CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES ON JANUARY -- MANY REACHING OR SURPASSING $15
AN HOUR-WITH ANOTHER 23 JURISDICTIONS SET TO RAISE PAY LATER IN THE YEAR 1-12 tbls.1-2
(2020) (showing that state and local minimum wage increases in 2021 during Fight for Fifteen campaigns
include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Montana, Ohio, South Dakota, and West Virginia),

https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Raises-From-Coast-to-Coast-2021.pdf

[https://perma.cc/T4

XS-APC6]. Twenty-seven cities, counties, and states have a minimum wage at or above $15 an hour. Id.

at

1.

Drew DeSilver, When It Comes to Raising the Minimum Wage, Most of the Action Is in Cities
112.
and States, Not Congress, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2021/03/12/when-it-comes-to-raising-the-minimum-wage-most-of-the-action-is-in-cities-and-
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employers have lifted their employees' wages at or above the new state or
local minimum in response." 3 Local minimum wage ordinances over the
past decade have expanded to include Uber and Lyft drivers, and other
transportation network workers classified as independent contractors.' 1 4
Other labor-community coalitions secured passage of scores of paid sick
leave and fair scheduling ordinances. 1 5 Current campaigns call into question
baseline assumptions about default rules in non-union workplaces, with
ordinances prohibiting employers from terminating employees without just
cause,116 and lawmaking during the pandemic establishing a "right to recall"
after mass layoffs" 7 and requiring joint employer-employee workplace
health and safety committees.1 18
Critical to these successes are the tightly networked labor-community
coalitions that participate in local labor lawmaking. Unions provide deep
expertise in labor law and policy and in workplace organizing, and they have
capacity for sustained workplace and political campaigns. Worker centers
and other community-based organizations, in contrast, are often
sophisticated in their use of social media and nimble in developing coalitions
with aligned local organizations. As Michael Oswalt explains, worker center
social media savvy can both galvanize worker participation in strikes and
protect participating workers by increasing the reputational risk of employer
reprisals. 1 9 Worker centers are also often deeply influential within local
states-not-congress [https://perma.cc/UT3Z-YJAC] (finding that only forty percent of employees in the
United States live in regions where only the federal minimum wage applies).
113.
By one estimate, from 2012 to 2018, Fight for Fifteen campaigns increased the wages of
twenty-two million low-wage workers and provided $68 billion in annual raises to these workers. NAT'L
EMP. L. PROJECT, IMPACT OF THE FIGHT FOR $15: $68 BILLION IN RAISES, 22 MILLION wORKERS 1-2

(2018), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Data-Brief-Impact-Fight-for-15-2018.pdf
perma.cc/TD6Z-E6XE] [hereinafter "NELP Report"].

[https://

114. Noam Scheiber, Seattle Passes Minimum Pay Rate for Uber and Lyft Drivers, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/29/business/economy/seattle-uber-lyft-drivers.html

[https://perma.cc/M27E-FQHP].
115.

Jacobs, supra note 103, at 281 tbl.1.

116.

New York City extended just cause protections to fast-food workers in 2020, and Philadelphia

to parking lot employees in 2019. Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, 'No One Should Get Fired on a Whim':
Fast Food Workers Win More Job Security, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/12/17/nyregion/nyc-fast-food-workers-job-security.html?searchResultPosition=1
[https://perma.
cc/XTV2-QYVR]; Juliana Feliciano Reyes, City Council Approves 'Just-Cause,'a Cutting-Edge Worker
Protection Law, for the Parking Industry, PHIL. INQUIRER (May 16, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/
news/just-cause-firing-bill-philadelphia-parking-lot-workers-seiu-32bj-20190516.html [https://perma.cc

/M3JP-AHRE].
117. Chris Marr, Pandemic 'Recall' Laws Give Nonuinon Workers Union-Style Rights,
BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Aug. 4, 2021, 11:11 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/dailylabor-report/pandemic-recall-laws-give-nonunion-workers-union-style-rights [https://perma.cc/3VRV-

DDYR].
118. See N.Y. LAB. L.

§

27-d (2021) ("Employers shall permit employees to establish and

administer a joint labor-management workplace safety committee . . . composed of employee and
employer designees .... ").

119.

See Michael M. Oswalt, Short Strikes, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 67, 91-95 (2020).
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government and can collaborate with local officials in enforcing standards
by referring complainants and by providing public education and services. 120
The translocal, networked nature of these labor-community coalitions
permits unions, worker centers, and local immigrant rights, racial justice, and
faith-based organizations to pool resources and draw in others, especially
lawyers in national economic justice advocacy organizations to contribute
policy and legal work across local boundaries.121 These tightly bound
networks of federated unions, worker centers, and affiliated local and
national groups resemble a version of the federated, translocal organizations
identified by Theda Skocpol as crucial to improving the political influence
of the nonaffluent during the Progressive Era.1 22
2. Pluralism
Local labor-community coalitions build and sustain social movement
energy through campaigns that foster solidarity among union and worker
center members and affiliated groups representing low-wage workers,
immigrants, women, and people of color.1 23 While the formation of laborcommunity coalitions can begin as a temporary tactic,124 over time the
solidarity forged through broad-based campaigns can make them more
inclusive and powerful, often deepening their impact and enabling more
ambitious goals.' 2 5
Pluralism serves a number of purposes for labor-community coalitions.
Ben Shapiro, OrganizingImmigrant Supermarket Workers in Brooklyn: A Union-Community
120.
Partnership,in NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR
MOVEMENT, supra note 18, at 67; Andrew Elmore, CollaborativeEnforcement, 10 NE. U. L. REV. 72,

107-10 (2018).
121.

Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV.

1879, 1897-98 (2007); Richard C. Schragger, Is a ProgressiveCity Possible?Reviving Urban Liberalism
for the Twenty-First Century, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 231, 249 (2013). Janice Fine and Michael Priore
stress the role of these groups in the shift toward localism as "a self-conscious political strategy developed
in reaction to the impasse at the national level by a network of criminal justice, labor, progressive, and
feminist policy advocacy organizations." Janice Fine & Michael Priore, Introduction to a Special Issue
on the New Labor Federalism,74 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 1185, 1087 (2021).
Theda Skocpol attributes the rise of political activism during the Progressive Era to the growth
122.
of "translocal," cross-class, membership-based organizations, which advanced subfederal policy
experimentation that eventually became federal law during the New Deal. SKOCPOL, supra note 58, at
12-13. These translocal organizations "then prospered by helping government to reach citizens with new
benefits and services for millions of people." Id. at 70.
See, e.g., Cummings & Boutcher, supra note 25, at 192-95.
123.
124. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 120, at 56-58.
125.
As public sector unions sought community support for living wage laws, for example,
community- and faith-based groups broadened the campaigns to include home health and childcare
employees, and then other private-sector employees, to fit "their antipoverty and racial justice agendas."
Jeffrey D. Broxmeyer & Erin Michaels, Faith, Community, and Labor: Challengesand Opportunities in
the New York City Living Wage Campaign, in NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND
THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT, supranote 18, at 80.
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It can inject political power in local labor lawmaking and demonstrate its
broad appeal to constituents of local progressive politicians, as in a Chicago
paid sick leave ordinance supported by worker centers, unions, and women's
rights, antipoverty, and racial justice advocacy organizations. 126 Pluralism
can also build political power for union members in communities, as in local
civic organizations formed by unions to hold voter registration drives and
lobby local policymakers to improve local services. 12 7 Pluralism, finally,
offers an approach for unions and worker centers to build solidarity by
embracing community interests. In Detroit, for example, a retail union, with
community-based organizations, launched a Supermarket Task Force to
alleviate "food deserts" with unionized supermarkets and improved
transit. 128 In Los Angeles, unions and immigrant rights organizations have
sought to improve access to workers' compensation and driver's licenses
regardless of immigration status.1 29 And most recently, the Fight for Fifteen
has developed a coalition with Black Lives Matter in a "Strike for Black
Lives" to protest racism and demand police reform. 3 0
This purpose, building solidarity by embracing community concerns,
helped reframe collective bargaining by local public-school teachers to
improve public schools for teachers, students, and parents. Despite high
unionization rates, public teacher collective bargaining has traditionally
suffered from budgets constrained by debt financing by cities. The Chicago
Teachers Union ("CTU"), in advance of its contract negotiation in 2012,
joined a labor-community coalition of parent groups and other communitybased organizations seeking to defend public education. The group identified
joint interests, including "smaller class sizes, improved facilities, and" other
terms in addition to wages, hours and benefits.13 1 In local demonstrations, it
publicized these demands and questioned costly school financing schemes
between Chicago and the financial sector. Gathering broad public support, it
struck for ten days, ultimately persuading city negotiators to abandon their
austerity contract demands.1 32 In the 2012 Chicago teachers' strike, by
126. Michael M. Oswalt & Cdsar F. Rosado Marzhn, Organizingthe State: The "New Labor Law"
Seen from the Bottom-Up, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 415, 468-70 (2018).
127.
Stephen McFarland, Bridging City Trenches, in NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS
WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT, supra note 18, at 187-89, 204-06.
128. McCartin, supra note 17, at 169.
129. See Chinyere Osuji, Building Powerfor "Noncitizen Citizenship":A Case Study of the MultiEthnic Immigrant Workers Organizing Network, in WORKING FOR JUSTICE: THE L.A. MODEL OF
ORGANIZING AND ADVOCACY, supranote 18, at 90-103.
130. Robert Combs, Analysis: Unions Find New Leverage with Social Justice Protests,
BLOOMBERG L. (July 24, 2020, 8:58 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law[https://perma.cc/6P9Z-TMU
analysis/analysis-unions-find-new-leverage-with-social-justice-protests

Y].
131.

McCartin et al., supra note 17, at 101.

132.

Id. at 101-02.
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broadening demands to include all city residents with a stake in public
education, teachers turned bargaining over a contract into "the epicenter of a
social fight jointed by parents, students, and various groups combatting
poverty, violence, and racism."1 33
The St. Paul and Los Angeles teachers' unions adopted the same
strategy. The St. Paul teachers' unions included community members in the
actual bargaining process, restructuring the normally secretive bargaining
process to become more inclusive and transparent. 134 St. Paul and Los
Angeles public teachers' unions drafted demands that included community
concerns. The United Teachers of Los Angeles ("UTLA"), for example,
sought legal assistance for immigrant families and an end to stop-and-frisk
practices on school grounds. The UTLA struck for one week, ultimately
accepting an agreement that included "smaller class sizes, nurses in every
school, a legal helpline for immigrant families, and an end to random
searches." 3 5
By augmenting union-employer bargaining with a political campaign to
end austerity policies that starve primary and secondary education, teachers
in Chicago, St. Paul, and Los Angeles made common cause with students
and parents, centering their demands for smaller class size and improved facilities in collective bargaining.' 36 The network of unions and community
organizations that engage in this approach calls this strategy "Bargaining for
the Common Good" ("BCG").1 37 It has urged public sector unions to expand
the subjects of bargaining to include "affordable housing, racial justice and
student debt to a bargaining table that includes employers, unions, nonunion
workers and members of the community."1 38 BCG offers a pluralist response
to the critique that public sector unions distort democracy by becoming too
powerful in local government,' 3 9 which subordinates the interests of poor
people and communities of color, 4 0 by including these groups as necessary
stakeholders in collective bargaining.1 4 1
133.

Oswalt, supra note 10, at 108.

134.

McCartin et al., supra note 17, at 101.

135.

Id. at 104-05.

Elizabeth Todd-Breland, Activist Teachers Aren't Just Fightingfor Themselves. They're
136.
Fightingfor Their Students, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/20
[https://perma.
18/09/04/activist-teachers-arent-just-fighting-themselves-theyre-fighting-their-students

cc/LAU9-YUES].
McCartin et al., supra note 17, at 98, 102.
137.
138.
Sharon Block, Go Big or Go Home: The Case for Clean Slate Labor Law Reform, 41
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 183 (2020).
Teachers' unions, in particular, have long been painted as an obstacle to education reform. See
139.
Levin, supra note 26, at 1340.
140. HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 18-19, 24-

29 (1971).
141.

The critique of public sector unions as bargaining in ways that can harm the public interest
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These examples are pluralist in their vision of building power by
seeking out opportunities for solidarity among economically and politically
subordinated groups to advance aligned interests. As laid bare by the safety
concerns of front-line workers during the pandemic, the interests of public
sector employees and the communities they serve can conflict. 14 2 Rather than
eliding this tension, however, the pluralism of labor localism actively seeks
to reconcile it in broad, bottom-up participation in protest and bargaining in
order to build local power. 14 3
B. THE THREAT OF STATE PREEMPTION TO LABOR LOCALISM

The recent widespread workplace protections ushered in by labor
localism has generated a fierce backlash seeking state preemption to
extinguish local labor lawmaking. The political contest between employer
groups and labor-community coalitions has come to dominate
intergovernmental relations between state and local government. 144 State
preemption of city minimum wage ordinances enacted after lobbying by
Fight for Fifteen is instructive. In response to the translocal approach of
seeking minimum wage increases in cities, ALEC developed a model state
preemption law. In total, at least twenty-five states adopted a version of this
model, preempting local governments from mandating a minimum wage for
private employers.' 45 Calling this "the new preemption," Richard Briffault
argues that the business lobby's push for a new, more aggressive form of
preemption is "aimed not at coordinating state and local regulation but at
preventing any regulation at all." 14 6 While classic state preemption analysis
sought to harmonize state policies with local additions or variations, the new
state preemption entails "sweeping state laws that clearly, intentionally,
extensively, and at times punitively bar local efforts to address a host of local
raises difficult questions about police unions, especially after the violent police repression of Black Lives
Matter protests in 2020. See Steven Greenhouse, How Police Unions Enable and Conceal Abuses of
Power, NEW YORKER (June 18, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-police-unionpower-helped-increase-abuses [https://perma.cc/WZJ5-NKZ2]. Because police unions are opposed to
BLM's calls for police officer accountability and local control over police officer conduct, BCG has not
emerged as a plausible pathway to address police violence and racism. See id.
142.
The safety concerns of teachers, for example, can be in tension with the demands of students
and parents for on-site teaching. See Diana Reddy, Labor Bargainingand the "Common Good," LAW
POL. ECON. PROJECT (July 29, 2021), https://lpeproject.org/blog/labor-bargaining-and-the-common-good

[https://perma.cc/KU8A-8DT5].
143. See id. (arguing that BCG "co-construct[s]" a normative vision of alignment through "broader
solidarities"). This is similar to Jocelyn Simonson's "ideal of contestatory democracy," which
acknowledges that "ideas cannot easily be reconciled," and "requires governance arrangements that
facilitate collective contestation and, when appropriate, subject reigning ideas to direct collective

resistance." Jocelyn Simonson, PoliceReform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 845-46 (2021).
144. Schragger, supra note 22;-at 1227-28.
145. Id. at 1174 n.59 (collecting statutes).
146. Briffault, supra note 22, at 1995, 1997.
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problems." 47 As state preemption has become a standard response, some
states have enacted sweeping versions to extinguish all local labor
lawmaking. 148 In 2015, for example, Michigan enacted the Local
Government Labor Regulatory Limitation Act, or so-called "Death Star
Bill," which occupies the entire field of labor and employment law,
preempting local lawmaking about nearly any workplace standard. Texas,
Oklahoma, and Florida have considered similar measures.
State-local preemption conflicts turn on the meaning of "home rule," or
"the commitment to local lawmaking capacity codified in the constitutions
and statutes of the vast majority of states." 1 4 9 All states provide some
lawmaking authority to local governments.1 5 0 Home rule reforms since the
Progressive Era have banned egregious state practices, such as attacking
specific cities, eliminating specific local responsibilities, or removing
elected officials.15 1 A second home rule reform movement in the 1950s and
1960s authorized local lawmaking about matters of local concern without
requiring specific state authority.15 2 Today, most states provide local
governments with "initiative" power to take legislative action.15 3
State home rule powers vary widely, however. Most states broadly
permit the home rule power to tax, borrow, and regulate to protect the
"health, safety, and welfare of the public." 15 4 Other states, such as
Massachusetts, specifically exempt key powers from their home rule
statutes, such as the authority to levy taxes, borrow money, or enact many
forms of civil and criminal law. This often leaves cities like Boston and
Cambridge without power to act without specific authority by state statute. 155
These cities instead have lobbied their state for authorization to enact
147.

Id. at 1997.

Local law scholars have used different terms to describe this new, aggressive form of state
148.
preemption. Schragger, supranote 22, at 1182 (using the term "deregulatory" preemption); Scharff, supra
note 22, at 1469, 1486 (coining "hyper preemption"). While these terms are useful, I do not adopt them
because state preemption of local labor lawmaking tends to be of a specific type and does not require a

typology.
149. Briffault, supra note 22, at 2011; see FRUG & BARRON, supra note 19, at 38.
150. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: PartI-the Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM.
L. REv. 1, 15 (1990).

151.

Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Secession of

Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 775,
805-06 (1992).
152.
The "local concern" distinction survives today in the form ofjudicial deference for traditional
types of local lawmaking, such as land use. See, e.g., Cannabis Action Coal. v. City of Kent, 351 P.3d

151, 157-58 (Wash. 2015).
153.
Briffault, supra note 22, at 2012.
Wisconsin, for example, permits local government "to act for the government and good order
154.
of the city, for its commercial benefit, and for the health, safety, and welfare of the public," in its home

rule charter. WIS. STAT. § 62.11 (2017).
155. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 19, at 66-7.
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minimum wage ordinances.1 56 States also structure home rule power through
judicial review. Some states, like Illinois, instruct courts to liberally construe
home rule powers. Others call for a narrow construction. 157
Home rule authority, and the expanding role of cities in national
politics, explains the increasing use of local labor lawmaking by laborcommunity coalitions. In states with broad home rule powers, courts have
generally upheld workplace standards as a valid exercise of home rule power.
As the New Mexico Supreme Court held in New Mexicans for Free
Enterprise v. City of Santa Fe,1 58 workplace standards are consistent with
local "power to provide for the general welfare of their residents by the
general welfare clause" of state law. 159
But "home rule has been far less focused on, and far less successful at,
protecting local measures from state displacement." 160 Local government
has limited authority in state-local conflicts to withstand state preemption
claims, even in strong home rule jurisdictions. Studies of home rule doctrine
in "weak" and "strong" home rule states find that this distinction has little
effect on how courts determine the validity of state preemption statutes or
their interpretation of preemption analysis. 16 1 Courts in states that require a
liberal interpretation of their home rule charter do not apply a preemption
analysis that is substantially different from those with weaker forms of home
rule.162
State law can expressly or impliedly preempt local ordinances. Local
ordinances are impliedly preempted if the state occupies the field or if local
regulation conflicts with the state law objective.' 63 In the first wave of state
preemption challenges to local labor lawmaking, courts addressed whether
state minimum wage laws preempted local ordinances with higher standards.
A liberal construction of home rule powers can establish a presumption
156. Rick Su, Have Cities Abandoned Home Rule?, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 181, 199 (2017).
157. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 19, at 61-69.
158. New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005).
159. Id. at 1162; see also Pa. Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh, 211 A.3d 810, 827-28
(Pa. 2019).
160.
161.

Briffault, supranote 22, at 2012; see also Schragger, supranote 22, at 1170.
See, e.g., Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North CarolinaLocal Governments Need Home Rule?, 84

N.C. L. REV. 1983, 1986 (2006).
162. Compare City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Ctr., Inc., 300 P.3d
494, 499-500 (Cal. 2013) (applying the presumption against state preemption), with Madden v. City of
Iowa City, 848 N.W.2d 40, 49-50 (Iowa 2014) (rejecting presumption against preemption). Even in
strong home rule states, courts tend to presume the validity of the state preemption statute. See Fla. Retail

Fed'n, Inc. v. City of Coral Gables, 282 So. 3d 889, 896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); City of Cleveland v.
State, 136 N.E.3d 466, 478 (Ohio 2019).
163. Graco, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 925 N.W.2d 262, 267 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019); see also
Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma ofLocalism in an Era ofPolarization,128 YALE L.J. 954, 982 (2019).
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against implied preemption, shifting the burden to the state to show that it
intends to occupy the field. 1 64 Consistent with New Mexicans for Free
Enterprise, courts in these states have found that an existing state workplace
standard is a "floor" that does not imply preemption of higher standards.1 65
This can require an analysis of the scope of express preemption in state
statutes regulating related matters, which can blur the express/implied
distinction and lead to inconsistent results. 166 Many other states have
narrowly interpreted home rule powers, finding that state workplace laws
impliedly preempt local standards to avoid abridging state police powers. A
New York appellate court, for example, found that the state's labor law was
a comprehensive scheme that occupied the field, preempting local minimum
wage ordinances.1 67 Courts that find local work standards impliedly
preempted express a preference for the uniformity of state law over local
variation. The Louisiana Supreme Court in New Orleans Campaign for a
Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 168 for example, interpreted a state
workplace law as a policy choice in favor of "consistency in the wage
market," requiring preemption. 169
And with very limited exception, courts have broadly construed a
state's authority to expressly preempt local labor lawmaking.17 0 Some forms
of constitutional "imperio" home rule provide local governments with a
stronger autonomy claim to enact ordinances about local matters despite
state preemption. 17 1 But the line separating a matter of "statewide" and
"local" concern can be impossible to demarcate. Its porousness invites
164.

See Associated Builders & Contractors v. City of Lansing, 880 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. 2016);

Diller, supra note 86, at 1067 (identifying a subset of states that grant local legislative immunity for
personnel matters).

165. New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149, 1159 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005);
see also Graco, Inc., 925 N.W.2d at 270; Marquez v. City of Long Beach, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 57, 77 (Ct.
App. 2019).
Whether a state law preempting local minimum wage ordinances preempts ordinances
166.
requiring benefits, such as paid sick leave, for example, hinges on the scope of express preemption, which
courts have inconsistently analyzed. Compare Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. City of Austin, 565 S.W.3d 425,
439-40 (Tex. App. 2018) (construing "wages" broadly and finding state preemption of local minimum
wage ordinances preempts a local paid sick leave ordinance), with Metro. Milwaukee Ass'n of Com., Inc.

v. City of Milwaukee, 798 N.W.2d 287, 311 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting the same preemption claim
because "wage" in state "statute is defined as the hourly rate and does not consider benefits except tips,
meals, and lodging").

167. Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New York, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862, 864-65 (App.
Div. 1962), affd, 189 N.E.2d 623 (N.Y. 1963).
168. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 So. 2d 1098 (La.
2002).
169.

Id. at 1106; see also Ky. Rest. Ass'n v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't, 501 S.W.3d

425, 431 (Ky. 2016).
170. See, e.g., Masone v. City of Aventura, 147 So. 3d 492,495 (Fla. 2014) (holding that "municipal
ordinances must yield to state statutes").

171.

Diller, supra note 86, at 1049-50, 1101.
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judicial discretion to strike down local lawmaking unless indisputably
local. 17 2 Courts expansively interpret express state preemption to avoid a
conflict with state law.
Local labor lawmaking, accordingly, even when supported by strong
justifications, and in strong home rule jurisdictions, will not prevail against
an express preemption claim.' 73 A Florida appellate court, for instance, held
that a Miami Beach minimum wage ordinance was preempted by a state
preemption statute enacted in 2003 despite the implication that the statute
was nullified by a state constitutional minimum wage approved by voters in
the following year.' 7 4 The only municipal minimum wage ordinance to
survive express state preemption, in St. Louis, did so on the narrow ground
that the state preemption statute violated Missouri's single-issue rule.'7 5 This
victory, however, was short lived, as the state subsequently enacted new
legislation preempting the wage increase.' 7 6
One might reasonably conclude from this summary that state
preemption, like some forms of federal preemption, 17 7 is an existential threat
to labor localism. Indeed, it has been in some states, nullifying minimum
wage ordinances in eleven cities.1 78 Alabama's preemption of the
Birmingham minimum wage ordinance offers a troubling example. Sixteen
days after Birmingham, which is majority Black, enacted an ordinance
raising the minimum wage from $7.25 to $10.10 per hour, Alabama enacted
a preemption statute, which was opposed by every Black state legislator. The
sweeping bill, supported by a group of all-white Alabama legislators,
occupies "the entire field of regulation in this state touching in any way
upon .. . the wages, leave, or other employment benefits," of employees or
independent contractors, without establishing its own minimum standards.' 9
The Alabama NAACP filed a civil rights suit against the state, arguing that
the state's preemption of the ordinance was motivated by racial animus. The
172.

Scharff, supra note 22, at 1522; FRUG & BARRON, supranote 19, at 61.

173.

See Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. City of Coral Gables, 282 So. 3d 889, 896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2019) (finding that state law expressly preempts local ordinance prohibiting polystyrene cups); City of
Cleveland v. State, 136 N.E.3d 466, 478 (holding that constitutional home rule did not grant immunity
from state preemption of local hiring preferences that "disfavor nonresident employees").

174.
2017).
175.
2017).

City of Miami Beach v. Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc., 233 So. 3d 1236, 1239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
See, e.g., Coop. Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.3d 571, 581-82, 587 (Mo.

176. See David A. Graham, How St. Louis Workers Won and Then Lost a Minimum-Wage Hike,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/08/st-louis-minimum-

wage-preemption/538182 [https://perma.cc/2BTT-9SFM].
177. Fisk & Oswalt, supra note 25, at 1526-27 (describing ERISA preemption of a state law
requiring improved employee health benefits as "local triumph destroyed").
178. See NELP Report, supranote 113, at 5 tbl.3.
179. ALA. CODE § 25-7-45 (West 2018).
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finding of the original Eleventh Circuit panel in Lewis v. Governor of
Alabama,180 not disturbed by its later en banc dismissal for lack of
standing,1 8 1 was that the state preemption response was plausibly a modern
version of "Alabama's historical use of state power to deny local [B]lack
majorities authority over economic decision-making."1 82
In many other states, however, the new labor localism has effectively
navigated these state-local conflicts. Labor-community coalitions tend to
seek out localism in order to build political power despite state preemption,
and state preemption can provoke engagement in state-local conflicts to
protect local lawmaking. Labor-community groups in Minnesota, for
example, persuaded the governor in 2018 to veto a bill that would have
preempted the St. Paul and Minneapolis minimum wage ordinances.1 83
Labor-community groups have also embraced pluralism in the face of state
preemption, developing coalitions with environmental, health, and other
1 84
interest groups to consolidate opposition to state preemption. This resulted
in the repeal of minimum wage preemption laws in four states in 2019.185
These coalitions have also sought state-level direct democracy
measures to preserve and expand their lawmaking. New York's implied
preemption of local minimum wage ordinances provoked Fight for Fifteen
to engage in state-level reform through that state's wage board process, a
1930s provision that had not been used in decades. As Andrias explains, this
provision was crucial in providing a mechanism for Fight for Fifteen to
secure representation on the commission and bargain with state and business
180. Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2018), vacated, reh'g en banc, 944 F.3d
1287 (11th Cir. 2019).
181. Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 944 F.3d 1287, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2019).
182. Lewis, 896 F.3d at 1295.
183.
Briana Bierschbach, It's Locals vs. the Legislature, Round 2: The Battle over Pre-Emption Is
Back at the Minnesota Capitol, MINNPOST (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.minnpost.com/politics[https://
policy/2018/03/its-locals-vs-legislature-round-2-battle-over-pre-emption-back-minnesota-cap
perma.cc/LJC2-PYFM]. A similar bill was recently defeated in Texas. See Will Anderson, Texas Cities
Retain Powers to Regulate Private-Sector Hiring, Benefits, AUSTIN BUS. J. (June 1, 2021),
4
.htm [https:
https://www.bizjoumals.com/austin/news/2021/06/01/texas-legislature-house-passes-sb-1
//perma.cc/N8JB-NP43] (discussing the defeat of Texas Senate Bill 14, which would have preempted
local paid sick leave ordinances).
LOCAL Maryland formed as a coalition of health, environmental and labor groups to protect
184.
LOCAL MD., https://local
About Us,
from state preemption. See
lawmaking
local
maryland.org/about-us/#top [https://perma.cc/H772-4QQ9]; see also Zoe Sullivan, Florida Groups Unite
to Take on Preemption, NEXT CITY (Aug. 7, 2019), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/florida-groups-uniteto-take-on-preemption [https://perma.cc/2X73-DDC4].
185. LOC. SOLS. SUPPORT CTR., REPEALING PREEMPTION: DEFENDING LOCAL DEMOCRACY NOW
INCLUDES A GROWING FOCUS ON RECOVERING LOST LOCAL AUTHORITY 4-10 (2019),
https://www.abetterbalance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01 /White-Paper-Repealing-Preemption-FIN
AL.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM8A-8JRN] (describing and assessing anti-preemption coalition's successful
campaign in Colorado to repeal state preemption of local regulation of minimum wage, tobacco, and oil

and gas drilling).
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representatives for a state-wide standard. The state department of labor
ultimately adopted its recommended phased-in $15 minimum wage for fastfood workers, which the governor later extended to all employees in the
state.' 86
These coalitions have increasingly counteracted state preemption with
state-level voter referenda. In Missouri, the "STL Can't Survive on $7.35"
Fight for Fifteen coalition engaged in several one-day strikes in St. Louis
and Kansas City, eventually winning $12 minimum wage ordinances in
2015.187 When Missouri legislators enacted a preemption statute in 2017, the
coalition responded with a "Save the Raise" campaign, which found support
from local policymakers and businesses. The St. Louis mayor implemented
its minimum wage ordinance, even though the state statute preempted it three
months later. One hundred local businesses, after complying with the local
minimum wage ordinance, pledged to continue paying the higher amount
afterward.1 88 Buoyed by popular support, the campaign introduced a state
voter referendum for a phased-in $12 state minimum wage, which passed in
2018.189 Like Missouri, Florida has raised its minimum wage by voter
referendum, first in 2004 and again with Proposition 2 in 2020,
constitutionalizing an increase in the state minimum wage to $15 by 2026.190
Florida also provides an example of labor localism despite state
preemption. Between 2010 and 2017, labor and community groups
successfully lobbied six Florida counties and one city to enact "wage theft"
ordinances, which permit them to seek owed wages through local
adjudications.1 9' The labor-community coalition successfully protected the
186.
Andrias, supra note 14, at 64-66; see.also Jesse McKinley & Vivian Yee, New York Budget
Deal with Higher Minimum Wage Is Reached, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com
[https://perm
/2016/04/01/nyregion/new-york-budget-deal-with-higher-minimum-wage-is-reached.html

a.cc/X67Q-7CFS].
187. Annie Shields, Fast Food Workers Strike in St. Louis, NATION (May 9, 2013), https://www.
thenation.com/article/archive/fast-food-workers-strike-st-louis [https://perma.cc/7EJV-97HY].
188. Melissa Etehad, St. Louis Gave Minimum-Wage Workers a Raise. On Monday, It Was Taken
Away, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017, 6:50 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nationla-na-st-louis-minimum-

wage-20170828-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZRS6-J97P].
189. Missouri Minimum Wage: Increases Jan. 1, GOVDOCs (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.govdocs.
com/missouri-voters-pass-new-minimum-wage-increase

190.

[https://perma.cc/F5PE-RDSS].

Eli Rosenberg, Florida Votes to Raise Minimum Wage to $15 an Hour, WASH. POST (Nov. 4,

2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/11/04/florida-amendment-2-minimum-wage
[https://perma.cc/3PME-LY3H]. Florida is only the eighth state to raise its statewide minimum wage to
$15 an hour, joining California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New
York. Chris Marr, States with $15 Minimum Wage Laws Doubled This Year, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB.
REP. (May 23, 2019, 3:17 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/states-with-5minimum-wage-laws-doubled-this-year [https://perma.cc/6D99-S8V6].
191.
ANDREW ELMORE & MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, STRATEGIC LEVERAGE: USE OF STATE AND LOCAL

LAWS TO ENFORCE LABOR STANDARDS IN IMMIGRANT-DENSE OCCUPATIONS 29 & n.133 (2018),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/StateLaborStandardsEnforcement_Fina
lweb.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D4S-CL4J]. For an example of a local Florida wage theft ordinance, see

&
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wage theft ordinances from inclusion in Florida's preemption of local
minimum wage and paid sick leave ordinances, retaining a local forum to
protest and claim unpaid wages as well as bargain with local government
about enforcement strategies.' 92
This account of the labor-community coalition response to state
preemption is less pessimistic than recent local law scholarship about state
preemption would predict. 193 Perhaps because of the relative popularity of
workplace regulation and political strength of labor-community coalitions,
labor localism has avoided the most hostile and punitive forms of preemption
that have attended other areas of local lawmaking. 194
But these accounts of state-local conflict generating new, effective
forms of protest and bargaining suggest that the reach of state preemption
95
can also be contingent on the capacity and ingenuity of the local response.'
Strengthened by popular support and imbued with social movement
activism, community-labor coalitions in Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, and
New York responded to the threat of state preemption by seeking state
openings for direct democracy and pushing local lawmaking into adjacent
areas. These groups have engaged in state-local conflict in ways that
ultimately strengthen the political power of poor people, women,
immigrants, and people of color to advance state and local lawmaking. This
can address concerns that local labor-community coalitions are fragmented
and concentrate a patchwork of regulation in politically liberal states,196 and
that preemption channels labor localism in ways that are opaque, discrete,
and potentially divisive.1 97 To the contrary, this account suggests that labor
localism can be effective, transparent, and democratic despite state
preemption, even in states that are historically hostile to unions.
State engagement by labor-community coalitions, however, can also
provoke effective state employer countermeasures. Proposition 22 in
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FL, CODE § 22 (2021).
ELMORE & CHISHTI, supra note 191, at 30 & n.143; H.R. 655, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla.
192.

2013), 2013 Fla. Laws 1-3.
193.

See Briffault, supra note 22, at 1997; Scharff, supra note 22, at 1486; Schragger, supra note

22, at 1226-27.
Schragger, supranote 22, at 1227. Texas, for example, reacted to the sanctuary city movement
194.
by calling for criminal sanction and removal from office any local official who limits the enforcement of

federal immigration law. See Briffault, supra note 22, at 2002-07 (discussing S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 2017), 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 7, 8-10).
195. See BLUE AND GREEN, supra note 25, at 188-99.
See Andrias, supra note 14, at 702; BLUE AND GREEN, supra note 25, at 345; Cummings
196.
Boutcher, supra note 25, at 187, 245 (cautioning that local labor-community group fragmentation can
stunt its ability to "promote a coherent national agenda, and . .. expand their scope and power"); see also
Johnson, supra note 28, at 1184-86 (arguing that concentrating regulation in "blue" or Democraticleaning regions is counter to the ideal of a broad, national baseline of workplace protections).
197.
See Sachs, supranote 25, at 1159-60.
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California is an important, recent example: Since 2014, Uber and other
transportation network companies sought to prevent state challenges to their
classification of drivers as independent contractors. Like ALEC,
transportation network companies have focused on state government,
persuading most states to enact statutes Classifying drivers as independent
contractors and preempt local lawmaking regulating drivers. 198 But in 2019,
California enacted a broad definition of employment that would likely have
extended employment protections to platform economy workers. 199 In
response, these companies sponsored Proposition 22, a statewide voter
referendum to exempt transportation network drivers from most state
employment law coverage. 200 After spending $200 million in a campaign
that combined elements of aggressive political and union-avoidance
tactics, 20 1 the proposition passed, deeming drivers for transportation network
companies as independent contractors and requiring a 7/8 vote by the
legislature to override the measure. 2 02 At time of this writing, a California
court has found that Proposition 22's limitations on the state legislature to
determine the coverage of state law and pass future legislation are
unconstitutional. 203 Regardless of whether that decision survives appeal,
Proposition 22 has emboldened platform companies to seek gig work
exemptions from the employment laws of other states. 204
198.

Gali Racabi, State TNC and MC Legislation: Preemption and Employment Status of Drivers,

ONLABOR (Oct. 19, 2018), https://onlabor.org/state-tnc-and-mc-legislation-preemption-and-employment
-status-of-drivers [https://perma.cc/FGF6-AJQ2].

See Assemb. B. 5, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg Sess. (Cal. 2019) (enacted) (codified at CAL. LAB;
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 606.5, 621); Assemb. B. 2257, 2019-2020 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (amending AB-5 to add exceptions).
199.

CODE

§§ 2750.3, 3351 and

200.

Graham Rapier, Uber, Lyft, and DoorDashHave Now Spent More Than $200 Million on Prop.

22-but There's Still No GuaranteeIt'll Pass, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2020, 10:54 PM), https://www.
businessinsider.in/thelife/news/uber-lyft-and-doordash-have-now-spent-more-than-200-million-on-prop
-22-but-theres-still-no-guarantee-itll-pass/articleshow/78958100.cms [https://perma.cc/8W27-SCTP]..
201.
Uber threatened to close or radically restructure operations in the state should the measure fail
to pass, and required drivers to view these possible consequences of a "no" vote before they could log in
to receive customers. Uber mined its vast driver and customer lists, pushing drivers to support the measure
and reporting driver responses to potential customers. Kate Conger, It's a Ballot Fightfor Survivalfor
Gig Companies Like Uber, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/23/tech

nology/uber-lyft-califomia-prop-22.html

[https://perma.cc/Q5TY-SP5K]; Alexander Sammon, How

Uber and Lyft Are Buying Labor Laws, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 5, 2020), https://prospect.org/labor/howuber-and-lyft-are-buying-labor-laws [https://perma.cc/8Q45-V7SJ].

202. Faiz Siddiqui, Uber, Other Gig Companies Spend Nearly $200 Million to Knock Down an
Employment Law They Don't Like-and It Might Work, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2020, 2:19 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/09/prop22-uber-doordash

[https://perma.cc/KKX

6-GPHB].
203. Castellanos v. State, No. RG21088725, 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 7285, at *5-6 (Aug. 20,
2021).
204. See Josh Eidelson, Election Day Gave Uber and Lyft a Whole New Road Map, BLOOMBERG:
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 8, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-08/prop22-gives-uber-and-lyft-a-new-model-for-gig-economy-workers [https://perma.cc/2G2D-UJLZ]. In one
high-profile example, Uber and Lyft unsuccessfully sought a New York State classification of their

2021 ]

LABOR 'S NEW LOCALISM

285

Proposition 22, along with Florida's Proposition 2 and the successful
public-school teacher's union campaign in Arizona for a voter-approved
state tax increase to fund local public schools, 2 05 collectively show the
benefits and dangers of voter referenda for labor localism. They offer laborcommunity coalitions a direct democracy mechanism to scale up campaigns
and "confront the politics that make preemption possible." 206 But as with
state preemption, they offer well-funded lobbying groups a means to nullify
legislation that underrepresented voters "obtained through the representative
system." 207 Even after a successful constitutional amendment, a state
legislature can seek to weaken it with a narrow interpretation 2 08 or nullify it
by indirectly penalizing local governments that take up local labor
lawmaking. 209 And, contrary to the standard account, state-level employer
countermeasures are not confined to politically conservative states. Local
labor lawmaking, and state-local engagement to protect or extinguish it, are
broad trends with national implications.
These trends are likely to intensify in the near term, as employers and
labor-community coalitions engage in state and local lawmaking in order to
reshape labor and employment law. The next Section will consider these
trends in assessing a recent reform proposal by the National League of Cities
to limit abusive forms of state preemption.
drivers as independent contractors that would have preempted a New York City minimum wage ordinance
for drivers. Annie McDonough, How a Dealfor Gig Workers Fell Apart, CITY & STATE N.Y. (June 25,
2021),
https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2021/06/how-a-deal-for-gig-workers-fell-apart/182731
[https://perma.cc/CT9M-SNPA]. At time of writing, these and other delivery network companies filed a
ballot proposition in Massachusetts modeled on Proposition 22, which by one estimate would lower the
guaranteed pay for drivers in that state "from $18 to as little as $4.82" an hour. KEN JACOBS & MICHAEL
REICH, MASSACHUSETTS UBER/LYFT BALLOT PROPOSITION WOULD CREATE SUBMINIMUM WAGE:
DRIVERS COULD EARN AS LITTLE AS $4.82 AN HOUR 1 (2021), https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2021 /09/Massachusetts-Uber-Lyft-Ballot-Proposition-Would-Create-Subminimum-

Wage-l.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NL5-5UD7].
205.
Juliana Kaplan, Arizona Voted to Tax the Wealthy to Pay for Public Schools, BUS. INSIDER
(Nov. 6, 2020, 11:19 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/arizona-voted-to-tax-wealthy-to-pay-for-

public-schools-2020-11 [https://perma.cc/56SD-RDVE].
206.
207.

Johnson, supra note 28, at 1196.
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrierto Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L.

REV. 1, 24-26 (1978).
208. S.J. Res. 382, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021) (responding to Proposition 2 with a bill
proposing to amend the state constitution to permit it to create a subminimum wage rate for employees'
first six months of employment).
Chris Marr, Arizona Lawsuit Highlights 'New Spin' on Wage Law Preemptions, BLOOMBERG
209.
L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Aug. 13, 2021, 7:42 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor[https://perma.cc/EQ5W-73L6]
report/arizona-lawsuit-highlights-new-spin-on-wage-law-preemptions
(describing Arizona legislative response to voter-approved constitutional provision permitting local
minimum wage laws as seeking to impose budgetary penalties on local governments that enact them).
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C. STATE HOME RULE REFORM TO PROTECT AND EXPAND LABOR
LOCALISM

Important values lie behind the debate about the proper role of local
government in state preemption disputes. Decentralization advances the
"constitutional interest in participating in government," 2 10 respects local
differences and local needs, and promotes local experimentation. 21 1 Labor
localism can advance democratic values, improve the responsiveness of local
government to the interests of poor people, women, people of color, and
immigrants, and improve worker participation in workplace regulation. 212 In
a functional state-local relationship, statewide centralization can improve
workplace regulation by coordinating with local governments in regulating
and enforcing local labor standards. 21 3 But the new state preemption does not
do this. Preemption threatens the values of decentralization by divesting
local government of lawmaking authority without advancing statewide
regulation. 2 14
A report by the National League of Cities and the Local Solutions
Support Center ("NLC Report") proposes home rule reform to curb abusive
forms of state preemption. 215 The key proposals of the report recommend
broad initiative power of local governments to "pursue any policy tool
available to the state," and a presumption against state preemption. 2 16 This
presumption would recognize only express-not implied-preemption. In
state-local conflicts, preemption proponents would bear the burden to
"articulate the substantial state interest at issue" and to show that the state
preemption is narrowly tailored to that state interest.217 While agreeing that
state preemption can raise concerns, the proposal provoked strong opposition
from David Schleicher. Schleicher argues that expanding home rule will
decrease local responsiveness and accountability and multiply the state
resources needed to strike down local lawmaking that harms the economy
and poor people.2 18
While this Article is aligned with the NLC Report's rationale for
210.
(2021).
211.

Nikolas Bowie, The Constitutional Right of Self-Government, 130 YALE L.J. 1652, 1663
Scharff, supra note 22, at 1491-92.

212.
Barron, supranote 33, at 2336 (arguing that local government can increase public participation
in governance).

213.

See Catherine L. Fisk, SustainableAlt-Labor, 95 CHL.-KENT L. REv. 7, 23 (2020).

214.
215.
216.

Briffault, supranote 22, at 1995.
NLC Report, supra note 29.
Fisk, supra note 213, at 24.

217.

Id. at 26-27. In preemption disputes, this would shift the presumption of validity to a state

burden to show a substantial interest in displacing local authority, and that the "state interference with
local democracy is narrowly tailored." Id. at 26.

218.

Schleicher, supra note 29, at 898-921.
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limiting state preemption, local labor lawmaking is not as threatened by state
preemption as in other substantive areas. Only modest protection to limit
implied preemption and curb egregious abuses of express preemption is
necessary to protect local labor lawmaking. As the previous Section
explained, state preemption is not always a danger for labor-community
coalitions, and there are good reasons to be skeptical of local autonomy. State
preemption can be justified to prevent local laboratories of economic
inequality. 2 19 Unchecked local power can also descend into parochialism,
used by affluent suburbs to exclude poorer and minority communities. 220
Deficiencies in local decision-making and inequalities created by local
autonomy in the interlocal city-suburban conflict can make decentralization
a flawed forum for policymaking. 22 1 States have an interest in securing
individual rights and in resolving inter-local conflict to deter local
parochialism and corruption. 2 22
But there is little evidence that uninhibited state power to preempt local
labor lawmaking would either improve local accountability or create a more
functional state-local relationship. Sweeping state preemption of local labor
lawmaking removes workplace regulations intended to protect vulnerable
workers, and it is likely to make local government less accountable by
channeling local labor lawmaking into secretive arrangements to avoid
preemption. 223
Focus on top-down state supervision of local lawmaking can ignore the
accountability gained from public participation in local lawmaking. 2 2 4
Proponents of statewide supervision of local economic development criticize
the use of local subsidies to attract mobile capital as a regressive form of
redistribution. The bidding war incited by Amazon in 2019 for local
subsidies to locate its second headquarters ("HQ2") provides a recent
Id. For example, ALEC-affiliated organizations have targeted unions with campaigns for local
219.
right-to-work ordinances in a number of states. Ariana R. Levinson, Alyssa Hare & Travis Fiechter,
FederalPreemption of Local Right-to-Work Ordinances, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 401, 403, 414 (2017)
(arguing that local right-to-work ordinances are preempted by the NLRA). But to date, states have
responded to local right-to-work ordinances by preempting them. See Denise Oas & Steven Lance
Popejoy, The Right-to-Work Battle Rages on at Both the Federaland State Levels, 29 MIDWEST L.J. 71,
91-93 (2019) (describing state preemption of local right-to-work ordinances by New Mexico and Illinois
legislatures).
220.
FRUG, supra note 34, at 7-8.
221.
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 355, 408 (1990); see also Barron, supra note 33, at 2333.

222.

City of Camden v. Kenny, 763 A.2d 777, 784-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (rejecting

home rule authority for local appointment power).

223.

Sachs criticizes this "opaque" form of local lawmaking for reshaping "local politics, leaving

us with a kind of politics of indirection," which "can be problematic in the long term for both civic
participation and social movement dynamism." Sachs, supra note 25, at 1159, 1207-08.
224.
K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The InstitutionalDesign of Community Control, 108

CALIF. L. REV. 679, 693 (2020).
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example of the destructive use of local capital to recruit mobile employers at
the expense of local taxpayers and displaced residents. 2 25 But successful
contestation of HQ2 in New York City came not from state supervision, but
from local labor and community groups, which injected discipline into that
city's development process. The open process by which labor and
community groups successfully pressed their demands forced the city to
consider the likely displacement of renters, and Amazon's hostility to
unions, and Amazon's refusal to grant concessions in return for $3 billion in
government incentives. 226 While the state could have secured the same result
by limiting New York City's economic development authority, it did not.
New York, like other states, was aligned with its cities in using economic
incentives to prevail in the HQ2 interstate competition for jobs. 2 27 State
limits on local public sector employee strikes and collective bargaining will,
likewise, not necessarily improve workplace governance or city
responsiveness. Historically, state collective bargaining laws prohibiting
strikes have increased, not decreased, teacher strikes. 228 While state law
reform could promote labor peace and deter abuses in collective
bargaining, 229 there is no evidence that state "right to work laws" have done
this. 2 30 These examples suggest that the local accountability sought by state
supervision proponents is likely to come, instead, from local institutional
designs that make "bottom-up contestation possible." 23 1
225.
226.

Schleicher, supra note 29, at 888.
Noam Scheiber, Labor's HardChoice in Amazon Age: Play Along or Get Tough, N.Y. TIMES

(Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/business/economy/labor-unions-amazon.htm

[https://perma.cc/H5CE-PXPR].
227. See, e.g., Edward W. De Barbieri, Lawmakers as Job Buyers, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 15, 18
(2019). Some states have since HQ2 considered participating in an interstate compact not to use tax
incentives in interstate competition for jobs. See Michael J. Bologna, Eleven States File Bills to Curtail
Tax Incentive Poaching, BLOOMBERG: TAX (Feb. 22, 2021), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-

report-state/eleven-states-file-bills-to-curtail-tax-incentive-poaching [https://perma.cc/4KDv-44GK].
228. Michael Finch & Trevor W. Nagel, Collective Bargaining in the PublicSchools: Reassessing
Labor Policy in an Era of Reform, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1573, 1583-84 (1984). This historic trend mirrors
recent #RedforEd strikes, many of which have occurred in states that prohibit them. See Oswalt, supra
note 10, at 116; Kate Andrias, Peril and Possibility: Strikes, Rights, and Legal Change in the Era of

Trump, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 135, 145 (2019).
229.
State collective bargaining law can promote public sector workplace governance by, for
example, offering interest arbitration of bargaining disputes. Joseph E. Slater, Public-Sector Labor in the
Age of Obama, 87 IND. L.J. 189, 190-91 (2012). The most recent calls for state collective bargaining
reform have sought to deter police unions from shielding their members from accountability for racism
and violence. See Benjamin Sachs, Police Unions: It's Time to Change The Law and End The Abuse,
ONLABOR (June 4, 2020), https://onlabor.org/police-unions-its-time-to-change-the-law [https://perma
.cc/78D8-A49A] (calling for state law reform to prevent collective bargaining from enabling police
racism and violence); Levin, supra note 26, at 1364-65; see also Fisk & Richardson, supra note 26, at
721 (proposing amending state labor law to permit groups of police officers favoring reform to bargain
with police departments in minority unions).

230.

Levin, supra note 26, at 1357-58.

231. Rahman & Simonson, supra note 224, at 693. As K. Sabeel Rahman and Jocelyn Simonson
explain, attending to the problem of police violence, for example, will require community control over
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Second, it is not clear that states that seek to stamp out rather than guide
local lawmaking are more responsible and accountable than local
governments. As Dahl observes, states have never been designed to be
democratic and have historically been dominated "by the relatively small
elites of wealth and status who were able to control one or both branches of
the legislature." 232 Because of "geographic and partisan sorting, as well as
strategic gerrymandering," Miriam Seifter explains, state legislatures often
make countermajoritarian policy decisions that reflect "the preferences of
big donors or the most affluent." 233 State preemption of local workplace
regulation widely supported by state voters is a leading example. 234 Civil
society and media also cannot serve as watchdogs as effectively over states,
compared with federal government, which makes states vulnerable "to
regulatory failures and factional influence." 235 While the possibility of local
government capture also warrants caution, 23 6 in state-local conflicts over
workplace standards, the risk of state capture by employers is the greater
threat.
This is especially the case for state preemption that shows little regard
for the general welfare of economically and politically subordinated groups,
as when majority-white states suppress local labor lawmaking in majorityBlack cities. Alabama's "rushed, reactionary, and racially polarized"
response to the Birmingham minimum wage campaign demonstrates the
considerable stakes in state-local conflicts. 237 As Nestor Davidson argues,
these conflicts are centrally about individual rights and "questions of racial
subordination and economic inequality," justifying judicial scrutiny of
sweeping forms of state preemption. 238
State preemption can ignore the traditional goals of centralization and
defeat the important decentralization values of self-representation and
experimentation. The NLC Report proposal that courts distinguish between
state preemption that seeks to protect vulnerable residents or a
comprehensive state regulatory regime, and state preemption that seeks to
stamp out all regulation, is a critical intervention. 239 State courts reviewing
policing. Id. at 727.
DAHL, supra note 80, at 139.
232.
Miriam Seifter, CountermajoritarianLegislatures, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1735-37
233.

(2021).
234.
that state
235.
236.

Id. at 1793 (citing Florida, which preempts local minimum wage ordinances despite the fact
voters "passed a minimum wage constitutional amendment by a supermajority vote").
Seifter, supranote 69, at 146.
See Elmore, supra note 120, at 123-29.

237. Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 F.3d 1282, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018), vacated, reh'g en banc, 944
F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2019).
238. Davidson, supra note 163, at 989.
239. NLC Report, supra note 29, at 23-27.
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sweeping preemption claims should consider whether state or local power
better "serves the state constitutional value of majoritarianism," 240 and the
harm of preemption to local democratic self-governance. 241 At a minimum,
courts considering equal protection challenges to state preemption laws
should, as in the Birmingham minimum wage ordinance, consider a state's
history of using preemption to silence the political voice of people of color
in majority-minority cities.24 2
While limiting express preemption is the most controversial proposal of
the NLC Report, its proposals that states provide broad initiative power to
local governments and curtail implied preemption are equally important. In
state-local conflicts, courts should find state local labor lawmaking authority
in the home rule power to provide for the general welfare. 24 3 Clarifying in
states where courts limit the initiative power of local governments, such as
New York and Massachusetts, that local governments may regulate the
workplace will broaden the reach and scope of labor localism.
Limitations to labor localism through implied preemption, as the NLC
Report suggests, can come primarily through judicial review of preemption
challenges to local labor lawmaking, particularly in states in which home
rule statutes establish a presumption against implied preemption. State
employment laws that set a floor for permissible statewide conduct do not
imply an intent to occupy the field, and higher local standards do not conflict
with a statewide minimum. Courts should view skeptically claims of the
value of uniformity of workplace regulation in state-local conflicts, unless
there is evidence that employers set uniform standards absent local
lawmaking, or that local variation actually harms employers.2 44 Local
minimum work standards advance the value of local democratic selfgovernment, and they can be tailored to suit local needs and promote local
experimentation. Courts should interpret a state law establishing a minimum
work standard as a floor, not a ceiling, unless the clear legislative intent is to
establish a comprehensive state regulatory regime that is incompatible with
higher local standards. Concerns about spillover effects into other
substantive areas can be addressed by preserving local labor lawmaking in
240.

Seifter, supra note 69, at 55; see also Paul A. Diller, The PoliticalProcess of Preemption, 54

U. RICH. L. REV. 343, 404 (2020).
241.
Bowie, supra note 210, at 1745. Nikolas Bowie locates in the state constitutional right to
assemble a right to local self-government. Id. at 1744-45.
242.
Johnson, supranote 28, at 1193-96.

243. New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149, 1159 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005);
see also Pa. Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh, 211 A.3d 810, 827-28 (Pa. 2019). Davidson
proposes that state constitutional general welfare clauses are "a structural principle to bring values such
as equity and inclusion to bear in the doctrine," which courts may interpret to address economic inequality
and racial subordination in state or local government lawmaking. Davidson, supra note 163, at 990.

244.

Johnson, supranote 28, at 1190-92.
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state employment laws. 24 5
III. THE EFFECTS OF LABOR LOCALISM ON LABOR LAW AND
LOCAL LAW
This Part will consider the effects of labor localism on labor law and on
local government law. Labor localism can expand remedies and the scope
and goals of strikes and collective bargaining by using local law instead of
or in addition to the National Labor Relations Act. It can also serve the
democracy-enhancing values of labor law and local law.
A. LABOR LOCALISM STRENGTHENS WORKPLACE PROTEST AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY CONNECTING LABOR LAW TO CITY POWER

The strikes of Fight for Fifteen and other labor-community coalitions
ignited mass participation, 246 galvanized public support,2 47 and inspired
similar campaigns and mass protests by low-wage workers in other
sectors. 248 While it is too early to tell whether this is a long-term trend, it has
revived protest by vulnerable workers as a strategy to improve precarious
work conditions.
The significant focus on cities by Fight for Fifteen has reinvigorated the
NLRA Section 7 right to protest. 249 Labor law broadly protects the right of
non-union employees to engage in collective work protests,25 0 including
political protests regarding employees' economic interests.2 1 1 But the NLRA
can insufficiently protect these rights during union organizing and elections,
States can amend their employment laws to add savings clauses permitting local labor
245.
lawmaking, just as many federal employment laws expressly permit subfederal variation and
experimentation above the federal floor. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 218 (permitting higher subfederal
minimum wages than the FLSA requires). In this regard, the lack of a savings clause in Florida's
Proposition 2 is a missed opportunity to protect local labor lawmaking in Florida by superseding that
state's preemption statute.
Oswalt, supranote 119, at 67, 70. While strikes in Wal-Mart and other worksites prior to Fight
246.
for Fifteen contributed to this trend, the wave of strikes initiated by Fight for Fifteen in 2015 generated a
public consciousness about striking that did not exist before. See Greenhouse & Kasperkevic, supra note

107.
Brenan, supranote 76.
247.
Rachel Lerman & Nitasha Tiku, Amazon, Instacart Workers Launch May Day Strike to Protest
248.
Treatment During the Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST (May 1, 2020), https://www.washington
[https://perma.cc/93GQ-T3PE];
-post.com/technology/2020/05/01/amazon-instacart-workers-strike
Bryce Covert, Like Uber, but for Gig Worker Organizing, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 30, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/9U6B-KCR3]
https://prospect.org/labor/like-uber-but-for-gig-worker-organizing
(quoting director of Working Washington, a Seattle-based worker center describing its efforts to organize
gig workers).

249.

29 U.S.C.

§

157 ("Employees shall have the right . .

to engage in ...

the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.").

250.
251.

NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1962).
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566 (1978).

concerted activities for

-
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and it imposes a confusing and punitive array of restrictions on union
protests. 25 2 This has contributed to a precipitous drop in striking in the United
States from previous decades 253 and an attendant decline in worker power.
Viewing recent worker protest and bargaining through the prism of
localism shows how crucial city power has been to building and channeling
energy from social movement into workplace protests. The standard NLRA
remedies of backpay and reinstatement do not address the full harm of
employer reprisals that crush organizing campaigns or make elections futile,
and insufficiently deter them.254 Anti-retaliation protections in local
lawmaking, along with penalties, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees,
can more effectively deter employer reprisal. The recent just-cause and rightto-recall ordinances expand beyond current NLRA remedies by eroding or
displacing the at-will presumption of non-union workplaces. While unions
and employers often agree to just-cause and right-to-recall provisions in a
collective bargaining agreement, this comes too late to protect workers
during union organizing drives and elections. By shifting these protections
earlier, to the outset of organizing campaigns, local labor lawmaking can
protect political and workplace mobilization at the time in which the risk of
employer reprisals is highest. They can also promote voluntary recognition
agreements, by taking these terms out of competition among union and nonunion employers in the same sector.
These campaigns have also sought forms of worker representation
outside of the NLRA, through sectoral bargaining for work standards with
252.
The NLRA limits picketing by unions for recognitional and organizational purposes, 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C), which the Board interprets to only permit picketing regarding "an unfair labor
practice, to support area standards, or to advise the public," Catherine Fisk & Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest
Under the New First Amendment, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 277, 288 (2015) (explaining Board

interpretation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C)). The NLRA also prohibits unions from engaging in secondary
boycotts, or boycotting companies other than the direct employer. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B). Violation of
these restrictions can result in large damages awards against unions, and can channel unions and their
attorneys into narrower, less impactful activities. See Fisk & Reddy, supra note 30, at 118-22, 124-25.

253.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") reports that mass strikes (defined as involving 1,000

or more employees) decreased from one hundred eighty-seven in 1980 tofive by 2009, their lowest level,
before rising to twenty-five in 2019. Annual Work Stoppages Involving 1,000 or More Workers, 1947
Present, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/web/wkstp/annual-listing.htm [https://perma.cc/
9M5Y-E54R]. While mass strikes fell in 2020, id., likely because of the pandemic recession, BLS reports
a new rise, to twelve mass strikes from January to October 2021, Laura Bliss, MapLab: Documenting the
Real Scope of U.S. Labor Strikes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
newsletters/2021-10-20/the-real-scope-of-u-s-worker-strikes-mapped. The BLS exclusive focus on mass
strikes omits the many walkouts by non-union employees during the pandemic for safety reasons and the
current "surge" across industries of labor protests and strikes involving fewer than 1,000 employees. Id.
254.
Weiler, supra note 46, at 1793 (administrative delay in reinstating union supporters is "fatal to
the viability of a union organizing drive"); see also Anna Stansbury, Do US Firms Have an Incentive to

Comply with the FLSA and the NLRA? 27 (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working Paper No. 21-9, 2021)
(finding that "under any reasonable assumption about the degree to which firing workers illegally can
reduce the probability of unionization, a large number of firms have a financial incentive to do so").
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employers and the state,
and "co-enforcement" by local government,
unions, and worker centers to jointly enforce work standards.25 6 By shifting
the scale of protest and bargaining to the regional and sectoral level, sectoral
bargaining and co-enforcement permits worker centers to bargain for
regional or sectoral work standards without being deemed "labor
organizations" subject to NLRA regulation,25 7 and non-union employers can
negotiate for them without unlawfully dominating or interfering with
unions.258 Sectoral bargaining, in which employer and employee
representatives bargain for standards with the state, is virtually unknown in
modern federal regulation. 25 9 But it is a familiar concept in workplaces in
which local government is the primary regulator.260 And though often
informal and temporary, 26 1 co-enforcement can provide unions and worker
255.
Andrias, supra note 14, at 35.
256.
Janice Fine coined the term "co-enforcement." In a co-enforcement model, worker centers
partnerwith government agencies to establish enforcement priorities and in the referral and resolution of
cases. See Matthew Amengual & Janice Fine, Co-enforcing Labor Standards: The Unique Contributions
of State and Worker Organizations in Argentina and the United States, 11 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 129,
129-30 (2017). San Francisco and Seattle have created formal co-enforcement committees with roles for
alt-labor groups to coordinate their enforcement with local government, advise the enforcement agency,
and report to the city council. See Elmore, supra note 120, at 107-10.
Duff, supra note 16, at 875-76. As Kate Griffith and Leslie Gates explain, worker centers are
257.
not "labor organizations" under the NLRA if they do not "actively seek to become the exclusive collective
bargaining representatives of employees." Griffith & Gates, supra note 15, at 605.
258.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization"); Electromation, Inc., 309

N.L.R.B. 990, 992-94 (1992), enforced, Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994). This
prohibition restrains employers from forming employee committees to engage in firm-based bargaining
outside of exclusive representative in the workplace and does not extend to bargaining for regional and
sectoral standards. See Hirsch & Seiner, supra note 16, at 1764 ("As long as the employer does not
recognize the group as a collective-bargaining representative and does not provide other unlawful
domination or interference, there will generally be no section 8(a)(2) violation.").
259.
The most prominent federal experiment in corporatism, or tripartite labor relations, was the
short-lived, private code-making authority granted by the National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA") of
1933, which the Supreme Court struck down on separation of powers grounds in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935). Tripartite commissions are common in Europe,
especially in Germany and Denmark, Andrias, supra note 14, at 35, and in Uruguay, C6sar F. Rosado
Marzan, Can Wage Boards Revive U.S. Labor?: Marshalling Evidence from Puerto Rico, 95 CHI.-KENT

L. REV. 127, 143-44 (2020).
260.
Cities have experimented with sectoral bargaining for workers outside the boundaries of the
NLRA, including taxi drivers and day laborers. In New York City, New York Taxi workers Alliance
secured a health care and disability fund from a portion of fares from fare increases, and recently
established a minimum wage for platform company drivers. Mischa Gaus, Not Waiting for Permission:
The New York Taxi Workers Alliance and Twenty-First-Century Bargaining, in NEW LABOR IN NEW
YORK: PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT, supra note 18, at 257, 264;
Shira Ovide, An Uber Wage Experiment Worked, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2020), https://
[https://perma.cc/2QV6-PU5M].
www.nytimes.com/2020/10/01/technology/uber-wages-new-york.html
The national federation of day laborer worker centers NDLON provides job centers for day laborers and
mediates conflicts with local law enforcement and businesses. Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at Work:

Defending Day Labor in Los Angeles, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1617, 1627-28, 1647-78 (2011); Dziembowska,
supra note 101, at 147-53.
261.

Oswalt & Rosado Marzin, supra note 126, at 422.
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centers with legitimacy and power.2 62 In public sector bargaining with cities,
Bargaining for the Common Good can overcome the limited labor law
requirement that employers bargain only over "mandatory" topics, by
multiplying the parties with interests in collective bargaining.263
Localism also permits the reawakening of mass protests in ways that
the current Board has sought to protect, and that might otherwise be
unprotected or illegal under the NLRA. The Strike for Black Lives brought
attention to the Section 7 protection of employees who participate in political
protests for racial justice like Black Lives Matter ("BLM") rallies. This has
led the current Board to broadly protect worker participation in BLM protests
and wearing of BLM messages at work under labor law. 2 64 Fight for Fifteen's
shifting goals for walk-outs across the stores of different fast food
franchisees can avoid the Board's currently broad interpretation of unlawful
"intermittent" strikes. 2 65 Concerted activities by gig workers could violate
federal antitrust law, since independent contractors are not employees under
the NLRA. 266 Labor localism can remove this threat by making local
262.

See Elmore, supra note 120, at 116; Fisk, supra note 213, at 24, 36.

263. Oswalt, supra note 10, at 102-03 (explaining the limitations of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3),
(8)(d)).
264. Robert Iafolla, Black Lives Matter Protests Protected, Top NLRB Lawyer Says, BLOOMBERG
L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Oct. 6, 2021, 1:38 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/blacklives-matter-protests-protected-top-nlrb-lawyer-says [https://perma.cc/WYM2-N8YA]. The Board has
recently issued a complaint against Whole Foods for banning BLM masks and pins at work for interfering
with employees' right to engage in protected concerted activities under labor law. Josh Eidelson, U.S.
Accuses Whole Foods of Banning Black Lives Matter Masks, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2021),
https://news.bloomberglaw. com/social-justice/u--s-accuses-whole-foods-of-banning-black-lives-matter-

masks [https://perma.cc/VW7Q-URWM].
265. In Walmart Stores, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (July 25, 2019), a majority of the Board ruled
that four separate one-day strikes to protest "employees' wages, hours, benefits, and other working
conditions," was an intermittent strike because of "direct evidence of a strategy [by OUR Walmart] to
use a series of strikes in support of the same goal." Id. at *1-2. Uncoordinated walkouts with separate
goals are distinguishable from the facts of Wal-Mart. In fissured industries, such as the fast-food sector,
the intermittent strike doctrine also has less salience since, unlike Wal-Mart, fast food franchisors
disclaim employer status.
266.
Antitrust law contains a labor exemption thatpermits workers to engage in collective activities.

Clayton Act

§ 6,

15 U.S.C.

§ 17.

But it has typically only been applied to labor unions, Hirsch & Seiner,

supra note 16, at 1777-78, while the broad prohibition of "restraints" in antitrust law and has been applied
to collective actions by independent contractors seeking to increase pay or reduce workloads, see FTC v.

Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 425 (1990). Hirsch and Seiner argue that independent
contractor strikes violate antitrust law but that agreements with companies may not. Hirsch & Seiner,
supra note 16, at 1777-79. Sanjukta Paul argues that courts should consider market power in determining
whether coordination by independent contractors violates antitrust law. Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring

Ambiguities ofA ntitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 LoY. U. CHI . L.J. 969, 1036-41, 1047
(2016). Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan has recently expressed concern about antitrust suits
against transportation network and similar workers and announced that she will provide "guidance to
courts on how the Clayton Act is designed to exempt worker organizing activities from antitrust." Letter

from Lina M. Khan, Chair, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Reps. David Cicilline & Ken Buck (Sept. 28,
2021)

(available

at

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/publicstatements/1596916/letter
[https://perma.cc/6ULC-

_to_cicillineandbuck-forsept_28_2021_hearingon_labor_antitrust.pdf
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267
government the site of protest and bargaining rather than the employer,
268
Moving
protecting it under a First Amendment exception to antitrust law.
the site of protest to the state can also avoid the threat of employer reprisals
and economic weapons that have increasingly become the standard employer
response to union elections and demands to bargain. 2 69 As with the minimum
wage increases sought by Fight for Fifteen, unions and worker centers can
press their positions without the threat of economic weapons-permitted
under the NLRA-to crush their campaigns. 270

The labor-community coalitions of labor localism can avoid NLRAimposed limitations to pickets and boycotts. Not-for-profit organizations that
do not seek to exclusively represent employees or bargain with individual
employers are not "labor organizations" under the NLRA, and so they are
not subject to these NLRA restrictions. 2 71 Boycotts and other economic
pressure by worker centers and community organizations, as the Supreme
Court explained in NAACP v. ClaiborneHardware,2 7 2 can instead constitute
political speech afforded heightened First Amendment protection. 2 73 Labor
See Hirsch & Seiner, supra note 16, at 1767-75.
267.
Fisk & Rutter, supra note 252, at 312 & n.220 (explaining Noerr-Penington First Amendment
268.
exception to antitrust law).
CELINE MCNICHOLAS, MARGARET POYDOCK, JULIA WOLFE, BEN ZIPPERER, GORDON LAFER
269.
& LOLA LOUSTAUNAU, UNLAWFUL: U.S. EMPLOYERS ARE CHARGED WITH VIOLATING FEDERAL LAW
IN 41.5% OF ALL UNION ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 7-8 (2019), https://files.epi.org/pdf/179315.pdf

[https://perma.cc/5MWJ-524J] (finding in study of all 2016 and 2017 NLRB-supervised elections that
employers were alleged to have committed unfair labor practices in over forty percent of elections,
including firings, coercion, and illegal discipline).
In this sense, local labor lawmaking has a similar advantage to worker centers' use of litigation
270.
in lieu of union recognition to advance a position. See Griffith & Gates, supra note 15, at 606 & nn. 19-

20.
The United Farm Workers, which is not a union under federal labor law because farmworkers
271.
are excluded from the NLRA, exploited this fact by organizing boycotts against major grocery chains
selling farmworker products, which would violate the NLRA secondaiy boycott prohibition if UFW were
a union. See ROSENFELD, supra note 8, at 156-57; Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The
United Farm Workers' Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and The Role of Law in Union Organizing

Today, 8 J. BUS. L. 1, 15-16 (2005).
272. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (finding that the First Amendment
limits Board iptervention since "expression on public issues 'has always rested on the highest rung of the

hierarchy of First Amendment values' " (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 567 (1980))). While
Claiborne deems that boycotts by groups other than unions are protected political speech, union
secondary boycotts are unprotected economic speech under the First Amendment even if the union calls
the boycott for political reasons. See, e.g., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212,
214, 226-27 (1982) (holding that longshoremen's boycott of cargo to or from Soviet Union to protest the
Afghanistan invasion is an illegal secondary boycott). This economic/political distinction has been
heavily criticized. Julius Getman calls the distinction "analytically unsound, historically inaccurate, and
culturally myopic" and calls for treatment of boycotts as political speech if they are called for matters of
public concern. GETMAN, supra note 8, at 99. Catherine Fisk and Jessica Rutter argue that the NLRA
prohibitions on labor picketing violates the First Amendment. Fisk & Rutter, supra note 252, at 300-15.
Getman posits that the secondary boycott restriction is unconstitutional on this ground as well. GETMAN,
supra note 8, at 99.

273.

Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 913.

296

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:253

localism can avoid a confrontation with the NLRA protest limitations by
restricting protest participants to non-union coalition members that are not
subject to the prohibition because they are not "labor organizations" under
the NLRA.
The labor localism strategy of striking to advance local labor
lawmaking also speaks to the debate about whether lifting standards through
local labor law is in tension with the labor law goal of facilitating the
collective strength of workers through unions. As Kate Andrias explains,
while employment and labor law can be mutually reinforcing, they can also
be in tension if the individual rights framework of employment law saps the
strength of collective action under labor law. 274 In the alt-labor scholarship,
Martin Malin questions the long-term impact of worker centers seeking local
labor lawmaking, 27 5 and Catherine Fisk, similarly, cautions that worker
center social movement activism is not sustainable without a legal
structure-akin to exclusivity in labor law-to institutionalize it. 276 This
raises the question of whether the shift to localism comes at the price of
institutional power through labor law.
But labor localism can be an effective response to changes in the
workplace that have placed the single-firm collective bargaining ideal of
labor law out of reach for many workers. Strategies to increase worker power
through firm-level bargaining must contend with recent transformations in
the workplace. With the shift from an industrial to a service sector economy,
the low-wage workplace in the United States is often geographically
dispersed and fissured into myriad subcontracted entities. 2 77 Employers
often have substantial buyer market (or "monopsony") power to set wages
in the entire region or sector. 278 Many other companies skirt labor and
employment law entirely by classifying their workers as independent
contractors. 279 New approaches to worker representation are needed to
address these challenges. Labor localism responds to these conditions with
coalitions of networked unions and worker centers, which while seeking
local labor lawmaking also often pursue unionization and collective
bargaining. 280 The Fight for Fifteen strategy to secure $15 minimum wage
274.

See Andrias, supra note 14, at 38.

275.

Malin, supra note 26, at 164.

276.
Fisk, supra note 213, at 7, 10; see also Daniel J. Galvin, FromLabor Law to Employment Law:
The ChangingPolitics of Workers' Rights, 33 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 50, 83-84 (2019).
277.
DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME So BAD FOR SO MANY AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 8-9 (2014).
278.
See POSNER, supra note 37, at 27-28 (summarizing economic evidence that employers with
monopsony power can set wages below their workers' marginal productivity, or what their workers would
earn in a competitive market).

279.

See WEIL, supra note 277, at 70-73, 245.

280.

See, e.g., BLUE AND GREEN, supra note 25, at 353-54.
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ordinances and unionization had an early success in Sea-Tac, Washington,
where the minimum wage ordinance led to the unionization of one thousand
airport workers. 28 1 The later minimum wage campaigns in Minnesota
strengthened the labor-community network, enabling it to pivot to
collaborating in successful union election campaigns for hundreds of retail
janitorial workers in Minneapolis and St. Paul. 282 The new Home Care
Employment Standards Board in Nevada, sought by SEIU home care
employee members, will bargain for standards that will apply to all home
care employees in the state, including union members. 28 3 In these cases, labor
localism seeks out lawmaking and unionization as mutually reinforcing
strategies.
In other cases, there is no tension because unionization is impossible
without significant labor law reform. Domestic workers, for example, are
excluded from many federal labor and employment laws, including the
NLRA. 284 Since domestic workers cannot join a union, the National
Domestic Worker Alliance (NDWA) has instead sought sectoral bargaining.
Recently secured "bills of rights" in Seattle and Philadelphia provide for the
appointment of domestic workers or worker centers to work standards boards
to elaborate and enforce domestic worker protections. 285 While these boards
do not provide for exclusivity, they do provide a forum for NDWA to bargain
for strengthened city standards and enforcement strategies. A formal role for
worker centers in the administrative design of local labor lawmaking also
permits NDWA affiliates to avoid being deemed "labor organizations" under
the NLRA, which can chill worker center activity. 286 Delivery workers
classified by their network companies as independent contractors (rather
than employees) have made similar gains with local labor lawmaking, most
recently in New York City, which has set minimum pay and other standards
JONATHAN ROSENBLUM, BEYOND $15: IMMIGRANT WORKERS, FAITH ACTIVISTS, AND THE
281.
REVIVAL OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 157 (2017).

282.
Steven Greenhouse, Twin Cities Janitors Declare Victory in Union Fight After 44-Month
Campaign, GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2016, 8:58 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/oct/13/
twin-cities-janitors-union-fight-minneapolis-equal-pay [https://perma.cc/Q5L6-JDEU].
283.
April Corbin Girnus, Nevada to Create Labor Board to Address Issues Within Home Care
Industry, NEV. CURRENT (Oct. 6, 2021, 6:43 AM), https://www.nevadacurrent.com/2021/10/06/Nevadato-create-labor-board-to-address-issues-within-home-care-industry [https://perma.cc/U45Z-Y9GW].

284.
285.

4500,

§

§ 152(3)

(domestic worker exemption).
§ 14.23.030 (2018); PHILADELPHIA, PEN., CODE, Ch. 99-4509 (2019); Oscar Perry Abello, Philly Sets New Gold Standard for Domestic Worker
See 29 U.S.C.

See SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE

Protections, NEXT CITY (Nov. 7, 2019), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/philly-sets-new-gold-standardfor-domestic-worker-protections [https://perma.cc/XS7E-QT8C].
286.
Participating in setting regional standards and in the enforcement of those standards do not risk
making worker centers "labor organizations" because this is not "dealing with" employers under the
NLRA. See Griffith & Gates, supra note 15, at 606-07; U.S. NAT'L LAB. RELS. BD., GEN. COUNS.,
ADVICE MEMORANDUM: RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTER OF NEW YORK (2006), https://onlabor.

org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/roc-ny-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6AG-Z4BC].
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for app-based food delivery services. 2 87
In the case of fast-food workers, while unionization is an express
ambition of Fight for Fifteen, the effectiveness of collective bargaining can
depend on the joint employer status of franchisors, which set the key
determinants of store operations. 2 88 Unionization has been an elusive goal
for fast-food and other franchise workers, at least in part because of the
Board's current, narrow joint employment definition. 2 89 But Fight for Fifteen
has continued to function as a union would. Responding to member
complaints about sexual harassment and unsafe working conditions during
the pandemic, Fight for Fifteen organized strikes and coordinated systemic
sexual harassment and public nuisance litigation in McDonald's stores in
dozens of cities. 290 These strategies may facilitate long-run unionization
efforts, as litigation brings franchisors' current exclusion from the
employment relationship into closer, sustained judicial scrutiny. 291
In sum, local labor lawmaking can advance unionization and collective
bargaining. For low-wage workers outside the reach of the NLRA, there is
little question that local labor lawmaking has increased their workplace and
political power. The formal, independent roles for unions and worker centers
in the elaboration of local standards and enforcement priorities can provide
these groups with a form of worker representation outside of the NLRA. 2 92
The public support garnered by Fight for Fifteen has translated into
minimum wage increases by state voter referenda, 293 and popular support for
287. Jeffery C. Mays, New York Passes Sweeping Bills to Improve ConditionsforDelivery Workers,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/23/nyregion/nyc-food-deliveryworkers.html [https://perma.cc/T93V-4E42].
288.
See Andrew Elmore & Kati L. Griffith, FranchisorPower as Employment Control, 108 CALIF.

L. REv. 104, 107 (2021).
289.
See Joint Employer Status Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 11,184,
11,235 (Feb. 26, 2020) (limiting joint employment to entities that "possess and exercise such substantial
direct and immediate control over one or more essential terms or conditions of their employment," which
likely excludes many franchisors).
290. Alexia Fernndez Campbell, McDonald's Workers Are Striking and Suing the Company-in

the Same Week, VOx (May 21, 2019, 5:40PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/21/186
33995/mcdonalds-workers-strike-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/VM3T-EHTZ); Lauraann Wood,
McDonald's Told to Give Ill. Workers More Virus Protections, LAW360 (June 24, 2020, 6:04 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/I 286329/mcdonald-s-told-to-give-ill-workers-more-virus-protections

[https://perma.cc/6FU6-5C85].
291. Kati L. Griffith & Leslie C. Gates, Milking OutdatedLaws: Alt-Labor as a Litigation Catalyst,
95 CH.-KENT L. REV. 245, 253 (2020); see also BLUE AND GREEN, supra note 25, at 353-54.

292.
293.

COHEN & ROGERS, supra note 80, at 58-59.
Marr, supra note 190; Gary Fineout, Florida's2020 Ballot Will Include $15 Minimum Wage

Question, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2019, 2:14 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2019/

12/19/floridas-2020-ballot-will-include-15-minimum-wage-question-1233568

[https://perma.cc/6JKK-

6VPG]; Michael Sainato, Fightfor $15 Campaign Is a Comeback for Labor Movement's Role in

Elections, GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/28/
fight-for-15-campaign-labor-movement-midterm-elections

[https://perma.cc/4353-9P3B].
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an increase of the federal minimum wage to $15 an hour.2 94 Sole reliance on
labor law could not have achieved these outcomes.
There are few legal limitations to public participation in local labor
regulation and enforcement. Participation by unions and worker centers in
the standard setting and enforcement of laws of general applicability does
not entail firm-based bargaining and so does not implicate NLRA
preemption. 29 5 Separation of powers does not limit co-enforcement, since
enforcement is an executive function and local agencies can properly seek
public participation in enforcement to improve compliance. 2 96 Sectoral
bargaining can implicate the nondelegation doctrine to the extent that setting
standards may be considered legislative. But in most states, these constraints
are no greater than those imposed on legislative grants to public agencies. In
those states, reasonable grants of power for private groups to bargain for
standards are permissible with adequate legislative direction and safeguards
to prevent abuse. 297 Local lawmaking cannot delegate binding decisionmaking authority to committees without agency oversight, 2 98 and sectoral
bargaining could not result in policymaking that overrides legislative
commands. 299 But these are not substantial limitations. Sectoral bargaining
satisfies these requirements with final agency approval and the availability
of judicial review.3 00 While some state constitutions with stronger
nondelegation doctrines may impose greater limits on sectoral bargaining
and co-enforcement, 301 even in those states, courts favorably view
reasonable delegations to representative groups. Inclusion of "all
stakeholders promotes competence and fairness," 302 and ensures the
participation of those with the greatest stake in the policy. For this reason,
Erik Wasson & Katia Dmitrieva, Biden Urges More than DoublingMinimum Wage to $15 an
294.
Hour, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Jan. 15, 2021, 3:55 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
[https://perma.cc/
daily-labor-report/biden-seeks-to-lift-minimum-wage-to-15-an-hour-in-stimulus-plan
758G-Y2RN]; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeanna Smialek, House PassesBill to Raise the Minimum Wage to
$15, a Victory for Liberals, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/18/us/
politics/minimum-wage.html [https://perma.cc/S38A-LK47].
295.
Elmore, supranote 120, at 130-31 (analyzing NLRA preemption of co-enforcement); Andrias,
supra note 14, at 91-92 (sectoral bargaining).
296.
Elmore, supra note 120, at 135.
297.
See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Off. of Env't Health Hazard Assessment, 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 537,

551 (Ct. App. 2018).
298. County of Riverside v. Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 573, 579 (Ct. App. 2016).
299.

Amica Life Ins. v. Wertz, 462 P.3d 51, 58 (Colo. 2020); see Daniel Schwarcz, Is U.S. Insurance

Regulation Unconstitutional?,25 CONN. INS. L.J. 197, 261 (2018).
300. Elmore, supra note 120, at 137.
Texas, for example, is skeptical of permanent, formal delegations to private groups that have
301.
an interest in the regulation. Tex. Boll weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454,

473-75 (Tex. 1997).
302. City of Houston v. Hous. Firefighters' Relief & Ret. Fund, 502 S.W.3d 469, 477 (Tex. App.
2016).
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no state has struck down a representative committee formed to set sectoral
standards subject to final agency approval and judicial review.
But collective bargaining by workers classified as independent
contractors can be considered an unlawful restraint under antitrust law,
requiring further consideration. 303 Local laws that restrain commerce may be
permissible under the Parkerstate action immunity exception, 304 so long as
the ordinances follow "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed ..
state policy" and are "actively supervised" by the state. 305 The Ninth Circuit
in Chamberof Commerce v. City ofSeattle,30 6 however, narrowly interpreted
these elements. The Ninth Circuit struck down an ordinance in Seattle that
sought to extend collective bargaining rights to platform economy workers
such as Uber and Lyft drivers. The court found that the state had not
expressly authorized the ordinance, and municipal approval of exclusive
representatives and collective bargaining agreements were not sufficient to
qualify for Parkerimmunity. 30 7
Chamber of Commerce has been criticized for adopting an overly
narrow view of state authorization and supervision, opening "the door to
municipal Lochnerism" 308 in which courts use antitrust law as a statutory
liberty of contract. But while the Ninth Circuit disregarded established
precedent finding that the Parker immunity state supervision requirement
can be met by local government supervision, 309 it is also a narrow holding.
Cities are entitled to Parker immunity under Chamber of Commerce if
accompanied by state authorization and supervision. 3 10 And, importantly,
even after Chamber of Commerce, co-enforcement is not susceptible to
antitrust challenges. Courts that have considered Chamber of Commerce in
challenges to local regulation have limited its applicability where there is no
significant delegation to private parties. 3 1- The lack of any true delegation
distinguishes co-enforcement from the Seattle hiring hall in Chamber of
Commerce and entitles co-enforcement to Parkerimmunity. Seattle can, for
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17; Paul, supra note 266, at 977-79.
Andrias, supra note 14, at 92 n.485 (discussing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
Chamber of Com. v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 790 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 782-90.

Sherman Act-State Action Exemption-Ninth CircuitHolds Collective BargainingOrdinance
308.
Not Entitled to State Action Immunity.--Chamber of Commerge v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.

2018), 132 HARV. L. RFv. 2360, 2365 (2019).
While municipalities do not receive the same deference as states under antitrust law, unlike
309.
private arrangements, the Supreme Court in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire instructed that state
supervision is unnecessary because municipalities generally act in the public interest. 471 U.S. 34, 45-

47 (1985).
310.
Chamber of Com., 890 F.3d at 776.
311. See, e.g., Meyberg v. City of Santa Cruz, No. 19-cv-00700, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81662, at
*13 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2020).
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instance, use co-enforcement to enforce its minimum wage ordinance
covering ride-hailing drivers classified as independent contractors since state
law contemplates local wage standards and enforcement of them.3 12
B. LABOR LOCALISM CAN ADVANCE DEMOCRATIC VALUES REFLECTED
IN LABOR AND LOCAL LAW

Workplaces and neighborhoods are principal sites of fortuitous,
involuntary associations, where strangers meet in daily life for common
purpose. Labor law and local law, as a result, share a similar vision of
democracy. Labor law, built upon a normative foundation of freedom of
association, can enhance workplace democracy, 313 while local law enables
community building through public democratic deliberation.3" For most of
the twentieth century, however, the separation of work and community
created a "split in the practical consciousness of American workers between
the language and practice of a politics of work and those of a politics of
community."3 15 Separate consideration of work and neighborhoods has
isolated discussion of these values in labor and local law scholarship.
With local government as the site of protest and bargaining, labor
3 16
localism joins the democracy-enhancing values of labor law and local law.
In building diverse coalitions of poor people, women, immigrants, and
people of color, labor-community coalitions can make local government
more responsive to these economically and politically subordinated
groups.317 As local labor lawmaking has become a vital form of city power,
cities have opened local offices to engage with these groups in their
regulation and enforcement of local work standards. 3 18 This has positioned
312.

See, e.g., Green Sols. Recycling, LLC v. Reno Disposal Co., 359 F. Supp. 3d 960, 971 (D.

Nev. 2019), aff'd, 814 F. App'x 218 (9th Cir. 2020).
DAVIDOV, supranote 35, at 39.
313.

314.

Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff, PreemptingPolitics:State Power and Local Democracy,

72 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1367-68 (2020); see also FRUG, supranote 34, at 20-22 (arguing that cities can
advance "public freedom" or the "ability to participate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect
one's life").
IRA KATZNELSON, CITY TRENCHES: URBAN POLITICS AND THE PATTERNING OF CLASS IN THE
315.
UNITED STATES 194 (1981).
Recent mobilizations involve "alliances among worker-oriented and place-based groups in
316.
which there is a link between 'workplace' and 'community' issues . . . [that] usher[s] in new forms of
social movements and contentious politics." Greenberg & Lewis, supra note 18, at 12-13.

317.

John Blake, The Fightfor $15 Takes on the 'Jim Crow Economy,' CNN (Apr. 13, 2018, 6:26

PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/13/us/fight-for-l5-birmingham/index.html [https://perma.cc/EQ97EKKK]; Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights Protection:An Alternative to Antipoverty
Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 6 (2009) (arguing that minimum wage laws are "central to
antidiscrimination projects").
New York City, for example, created the Office of Labor Policy & Standards in 2016, which
318.
"enforces key municipal workplace laws, conducts original research, and develops policies" related to
workers. Office of Labor Policy & Standards, NYC CONSUMER & wORKER PROT.,
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cities as key workplace regulators and the primary defenders of local labor
lawmaking in litigation challenges."' It has also transformed the relationship
of the National League of Cities to these groups. While in the 1970s NLC
was best known for fighting the federal regulation of labor and hours of city
employees, 320 today it criticizes state preemption as "a threat to local
democracy and city success." 321 By aligning the interests of laborcommunity coalitions and cities in local labor lawmaking, labor localism can
make local government more inclusive as "the political link between the city
and these special populations." 322
Labor localism also serves democratic values by offering these groups
direct democracy mechanisms to participate in local workplace regulation.
Local governments often encourage public participation in local decisionmaking as a means to legitimate city power. 32 3 Proposals for city growth, for
example, are often contingent on community support. Local governments
seek community representatives to stand in for the community to determine
the direction and scope of local government growth policies. 32 4 Labor
localism, similarly, facilitates public participation in elaborating and
https://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/dca/about/office-of-labor-policy-standards.page [https://perma.cc/3D7C-EC
3T]. That office recently announced its first resolution of a just cause ordinance investigation. See Justice
for Two Brooklyn Fast Food Workers in City's First "Just Cause" Case, NYC CONSUMER & WORKER
PROT. (Dec. 14, 2021), https://wwwI.nyc.gov/site/dca/media/prl21421-Subway-First-Just-Cause-Settlement.page [https://perma.cc/XZR4-A8B9].

319. See, e.g., Graco, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 925 N.W.2d 262, 274 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019),
aff'd, 937 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. 2020) (Minneapolis successfully defended minimum wage ordinance from
implied state preemption claim); City of Miami Beach v. Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc., 233 So. 3d 1236, 1240
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (Miami Beach unsuccessfully defended minimum wage from express state
preemption claim).

320. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 836-37 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (challenging application of FLSA to state and local
employees under the "constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity"); Judith Resnik, Joshua
Civin & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal
Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 784 (2008).
321.
NAT'L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE
ANALYSIS 1 (2018), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/NLC-SML-Preemption-Report-

2017-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGC4-5PNL].
322.

FRUG, supra note 34, at 117-20. Evidence of city alignment with diverse coalitions extends

well beyond labor lawmaking, to Florida cities joining civil rights groups in challenging that state's "antiriot" law and North Carolina cities extending workplace discrimination protections to the LGBTQ
community. Mary Ellen Klas, Florida Cities Sue State Over 'Anti-Riot' Law, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov.

16,

2021), https://www.tampabay.com/news/florida-politics/2021/11/16/florida-cities-sue-state-over-

anti-riot-law [https://perma.cc/FC5J-M5AW]; Chris Marr, North Carolina Anti-Bias Laws Sprout as
'Bathroom Bill' Era Ends, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Nov. 22, 2021), https://news.bloom
berglaw.com/daily-labor-report/north-carolina-anti-bias-laws-sprout-as-bathroom-bill-era-ends [https://

perma.cc/MYL3-9NGU].
323.
Frugg, supra note 79 1067-73 (arguing that city power can encourage local participation);
Davidson, supra note 163, at 975 (describing "democratic participation and local political engagement"
as one justification for localism).
324.
JEFFREY M. BERRY & DAVID F. ARONS, A VOICE FOR NONPROFITS 115-16 (2005).
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enforcing workplace standards. After labor-community coalitions succeed in
local labor lawmaking, worker centers and unions act as watchdogs for
government enforcement, and they collaborate with local agencies to train
employers and workers and enforce these standards. 325 Bargaining for the
Common Good offers another way to promote democratic values, with the
formal inclusion of communities in collective bargaining with public sector
unions and cities. These direct democracy mechanisms offer real power to
unions, worker centers, and affiliated community organizations. 326
This democratic impulse of labor localism is aligned with calls of local
law scholars for more inclusive local governments. 327 As Richard Briffault
explains, interlocal competition for taxpayers and businesses, especially
between cities and suburbs, often causes the suburbs to use local power to
preserve and reinforce existing economic inequalities. 328 Zoning and
redevelopment policies have a powerful impact on the allocation of
resources, 32 9 which local governments have historically used to exclude poor
people and people of color. 330 Cities historically responded to the threat of
interlocal competition by taxing residents to subsidize the recruitment and
retention of businesses in order to avoid capital flight.33 1 Use of city
resources to develop commercial centers instead of pursuing redistributionist
policies, 332 again, often occurs at the expense of poor people and people of
color. 333

This account suggests that, contrary to the standard account of city
powerlessness limiting public freedom, 334 city power can expand public
freedom by channeling the social movement energy generated by labor
325.

Elmore, supra note 120, at 102-13.

This account of local government mechanisms to exercise political power is similar to the
326.
community control proposal by K. Sabeel Rahman and Jocelyn Simonson of local administrative designs
in which communities "exercis[e] real power" in local government. Rahman & Simonson, supra note

224, at 727.
327.
328.

FRUG, supra note 34, at 173.
Briffault, supra note 150, at 3-4.

329.

Id.

California municipalities and New York City used zoning law in the 1880s to drive out
330.
immigrants from gentrifying neighborhoods. By the 1920s the federal government popularized zoning as
a local policy tool to attract investment by excluding undesirable development. FRUG, supra note 34, at

143-45.
331.
Schragger, supra note 33, at 495-97. In a Tiebout model, assuming that capital is mobile,
competition by local governments for development results in an efficient allocation of development
among cities. Id. at 496.
332.
FRUG & BARRON, supra note 19, at 28.
333.
Cities primarily spent federal urban renewal money from 1949 to 1988 on commercial projects,
which transformed the economies of central cities but eliminated 400,000 low-income dwellings in the
process. The increase in jobs primarily went to commuters, not to poor people. FRUG, supra note 34, at

146-47.
334.

Id. at 20-21.
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localism into broad and expansive local labor lawmaking. This is similar to
Richard Schragger's description of site fights and living wage laws in the
2000s as a form of "economic localism." 335 But in contrast to the temporary
tactic of targeting a single employer in a national campaign, the new labor
localism is broader and deeper, extending, lifting, and strengthening work
standards over time, across entire regions or sectors. This can foster a
dynamic process, in which the broad economic redistribution from local
lawmaking to economic and politically subordinated groups can inspire these
groups to sustain longer-term campaigns to ratchet up local standards, and to
scale up and undertake more ambitious goals.
The primary objection to the claim that labor localism serves
democratic values is that local labor lawmaking might harm communities by
driving out mobile capital. The capital mobility critique is a version of the
interlocal competition concern that surrounding local jurisdictions will
respond to local labor lawmaking in a neighboring city by luring businesses
away from the city.336 Capital flight from local labor lawmaking could harm
poorer communities by driving away businesses and reducing local
employment. 33 7 As Richard Schragger notes, capital flight is unlikely if
businesses are place dependent or receive agglomeration benefits that exceed
the cost of economic legislation. 338 If capital cannot easily exit cities because
it is "sticky," economic localism that targets sticky capital is a form of city
power that can redistribute for welfarist ends without risking capital flight.3 39
But this defense of local economic legislation would not justify expansive
local labor lawmaking that applies employment mandates to all local
businesses, whether or not they are theoretically mobile. 340
Studies of the economic effects of minimum wage ordinances over the
past fifteen years, however, have consistently found that local wage
mandates do not have a harmful effect on labor markets. 34 1 This suggests
335.
336.
337.

SCHRAGGER, supra note 19, at 181-88.
See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 19, at 16-19 (describing this critique).
Schleicher argues that exclusionary zoning regulation can make housing less affordable and

harm local economies. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1676 (2013). This
critique can be extended to local labor lawmaking if lifting work standards drives employers out of the
jurisdiction. See Schleicher, supra note 29, at 908 ("Commercial zoning can be about exclusion,
jurisdictions too good for Dollar Stores or wal-Marts keeping them and their low-priced goods away (and
thus excluding the poor and middle-class shoppers).").
338.
Agglomeration refers to a localized economy in which companies and workers benefit from
the proximity, such as technology firms and programmers in Silicon valley, or film studios and actors in

Los Angeles. Schleicher, supra note 37, at 99-102.
339. Schragger, supra note 33, at 539.,
340.

Translocalism in this regard can stand in for regional cooperation, which is often limited by

local government law. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 19, at 9.
341.
See, e.g., Doruk Cengiz, Arindrajit Dube, Attila Lindner & Ben Zipperer, The Effect of
Minimum Wages on Low-Wage Jobs, 134 Q.J. ECON. 1405 (2019) (examining 138 minimum wage
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that the capital mobility critique overestimates the extent to which wage
mandates drive employer decisions about entering and exiting a labor
market. The assumption of competitive labor markets animating the capital
mobility critique, additionally, overlooks the possibility of employer
monopsony power over hiring.34 2 Since employers with monopsony power
can often raise wages without laying off employees, local labor lawmaking
can raise these workers' wages without causing job losses.3 43 While the
precise reasons that local labor lawmaking has not had an adverse effect on
labor markets is open to debate, these studies leave little doubt that local
labor lawmaking is not exclusionary.
The economic debate, moreover, should not distract from the
democratic values advanced by labor localism. Enabling subordinated
groups to engage in direct democracy mechanisms to improve workplace
governance enlarges public freedom. This justifies the use of city power for
local labor lawmaking, notwithstanding its efficiency.
IV. LABOR LOCALISM AND LABOR LAW REFORM
As a strategy to strengthen and lift workplace standards, labor localism
begs the question of what values localism serves in workplace regulation that
are not better served by state or federal law reform. This question has come
to the fore in the current era of renewed federal interest in raising workplace
standards. 34 4 In our federalist labor and employment law, federal and state
increases between 1979 and 2016 and finding no change in the number of low-wage jobs); Arindrajit

Dube, T. William Lester & Michael Reich, Minimum Wage Effects Across State Borders:Estimates Using
Contiguous Counties, 92 REv. ECON. & STAT. 945, 962 (2010) (comparing contiguous counties that
straddle a state border and finding no adverse employment effect from local differences in minimum wage
policies); Arindrajit Dube, Suresh Naidu & Michael Reich, The Economic Effects ofa Citywide Minimum
Wage, 60 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REv. 522, 522 (2007) (examining effects of San Francisco minimum
wage increases in 2004 and 2007 on restaurant industry, finding that they "increased worker pay and
compressed wage inequality, but did not create any detectable employment loss among affected
restaurants").
See POSNER, supra note 37, at 27-28 (reviewing literature and concluding that "there is little
342.
doubt that the traditional model of competitive labor markets is wrong, that monopsony or monopsonistic
competition is pervasive, that many labor markets are highly concentrated, and that labor monopsony, as
theory would predict, pushes wages below the competitive rate"); see also Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner
& Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 537, 553-54 (2018).
343.
See POSNER, supra note 37, at 124. See generally Jose Azar, Emiliano Huet-Vaugh, Ioana
Marinescu, Bledi Taska & Till von Wachter, Minimum Wage Employment Effects and Labor Market
Concentration(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26101, 2019).
At time of writing, President Biden has signed an executive order requiring federal contractors
344.
to pay a $15 minimum wage and called on Congress to enact a federal $15 minimum wage and federal
labor law reform. See Noam Scheiber, Biden Orders $15 Minimum Wage for FederalContractors,N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/27/business/economy/biden-minimum-wagefederal-contractors.html [https://perma.cc/CGF3-369T]; Alex Gangitano, Biden Calls for Passage of
PRO Act, $15 Minimum Wage in JointAddress, HILL (Apr. 28, 2021, 9:52 PM), https://thehill.com/home
news/administration/550845-biden-calls-for-passage-of-pro-union-pro-act-and-15-minimum-wage [http

s://perma.cc/YY7V-5EBA].
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governments permit local government to regulate the workplace
cooperatively, while preempting forms of local lawmaking that conflict with
federal and state policy. This implies a limited role for local government
during periods of expansive federal regulation. That labor-community
coalitions can seek policy experimentation in local government, and prevail
in state-local conflicts, does not necessarily challenge this view.3 45 Local
labor lawmaking can still be a second-best, less effective alternative to
federal or state reform, primarily useful when significant federal and state
reform is impossible. 34 6
This Article locates the value of labor localism in its advancement of
the democratic values underlying labor law and local law. Central to this
claim, as was well understood by the New Deal architects of labor law, 34 7 is
the interdependence of political and economic democracy.3 48 Labor localism
as a safeguard of democratic norms in the United States 49 is different from
defenses of localism grounded in the assertion of local interests to federal
and state government, a tradition of local regulation, or tailoring regulation
to local needs.35 0 It is instead rooted in the "local democracy, community,
and participation" that justify city power. 31 As described in this Article,
labor localism can encourage participation by economically and politically
subordinated workers in concerted activities, collective bargaining, and in
the elaboration and enforcement of work laws. Doing so within and
alongside local government can deliver immediate benefits to participants
and foster deeper collective commitments beyond a single collective
bargaining agreement or ordinance. Participation in sustained collective
activities, with bigger and longer-term goals, can alter how participants see
As Heather Gerken explains, in the new federalism, local governments are additional
345.
battlegrounds in polarized contests between "highly networked national interest groups" across state and

local jurisdictions. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REv. 1695, 1720 (2017).
See Johnson, supranote 28, at 1184-86 (explaining that reformers would ideally want national346.
level reform to avoid variation in civil rights and workers' rights).
In enacting the NLRA in 1935, Congress sought "to create a more equitable political economy
347.
and a more robust political democracy by protecting workplace democracy." Ashar & Fisk, supra note
15, at 187. The chief sponsor of the NRLA, Robert wagner, "had an all-consuming commitment to
collective bargaining as an integral component of political democracy in the age of mass production."
Mark Barenberg, The PoliticalEconomy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation,
106 HARV. L. REv. 1379, 1410 (1993). For Senator wagner, at stake in the right to collectively bargain
was "the heart of the struggle for the preservation of political as well as economic democracy in America."
Joseph A. McCartin, Rejoinder, 14 LAB.: STUD. WORKING-CLASS HIST. 61, 66 (2017).
348.
See supra Section I.A; Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing

Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of PoliticalInequality, 130 YALE L.J. 546, 562-73 (2021).
McCartin, supra note 347, at 66.
349.
350.
See, e.g., Su, supra note 18, at 1637-38 (proposing that localism enables local governmeit to
assert local interests in immigration law to federal and state agencies); Blocher, supra note 32, at 11l
(arguing that firearm localism is rooted in "history and tradition").

351.

Davidson, supranote 163, at 959.
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themselves and their own power. It is within this "thick action of concerted"
activities, as Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres explain, that regular people can
"discover and legitimize the principles on which our democracy presumably
rests." 3s2

While these activities could occur at the federal and state levels, the
direct democracy mechanisms necessary to build and channel social
movement energy into workplace governance often originate in cities. Social
movements often begin, and build, with local protest and legislative
experimentation in local social movement organizations. 353 Successful local
innovations spread across state and local boundaries and can create
federal
for
constituencies
with
built-in
models
legislative
54
To be sure, a national reform effort rooted in localism is
experimentation.
contingent on its ability to counter political opposition and spread. 355 But in
this bottom-up view, asking whether localism is preferable to national reform
can obscure the extent to which national reform begins with, and is sustained
by, the social movement energy and policy experimentation of localism.
Labor law itself is a product of this dynamic. During the Progressive
Era, unions with small businesses controlled local wages and prices in cities,
facilitated by local lawmaking. 356 As the pace and scale of industry expanded
at the turn of the century, unions centralized and shifted to regional and
national strategies to collectively bargain with national employers. 357 The
city-wide price and wage controls of the Progressive Era became an available
model for national economic stabilization for New Deal reformers in the
enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which conferred
code-making authority on unions and industry associations. 35' After the
Supreme Court struck down the private code-making authority granted by
Guinier & Torres, supra note 30, at 2749, 2790 (describing the "broader mobilization effort[s]"
352.
of the United Farm Workers as focused on "alter[ing] the way farmworkers viewed themselves and their
own power within the system" rather than on a specific change to "the legal reality of the farmworkers").
EQUAL PLACE, supra note 25, at 7-8; see also Amna A. Akbar, Sameer M. Ashar & Jocelyn
353.
Simonson, Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 821, 854 (2021) ("[G]rassroots contestation at the local
level is central to the shape of law and legal entitlements."); Andrias & Sachs, supra note 348, at 59697; Guinier & Torres, supranote 30, at 2757-58.
Andrias & Sachs, supra note 348, at 632.
354.
Johnson, supranote 28, at 1186 ("To be viable practically as well as consistent with democratic
355.
ideals depends on empirical assumptions that positive laws and regulations for workers will spread.").
356.
Christopher L. Tomlins, The New Deal, Collective Bargaining,and the Triumph of Industrial
Pluralism, 39 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 19, 21 (1985).
See Craig Becker, Individual Rights and Collective Action: The Legal History of Trade Unions
357.
in America, 100 HARV. L. REV. 672, 676-77 (1987) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE
AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA,

1880-1960 (1985)).
See COHEN, supra note 83, at 265 ("New Deal industrial policies originated in the construction
358.
sites and garages, storefronts, saloons, and union halls of cities like Chicago.").
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NIRA as an unconstitutional legislative delegation, 59 New Deal reformers
turned to the national trade agreement model in the NRLA by protecting the
right to collective bargaining in unions.360 Recent labor history mirrors this
pattern, 361 and suggests a similar pathway for a national $15-an-hour
minimum wage, paid sick leave, and labor law reform today.3 62 One sees in
the examples of labor localism offered in this Article a bottom-up reform
effort with national aspirations, fueled by local social movement energy and
policy experimentation.
Whatever its immediate impact on federal law reform, moreover, labor
localism has advanced the more durable and transformative goal of
democratizing workplaces and communities. By joining the democratic
values of labor and local law, labor localism builds the power of
subordinated groups through collective participation in labor-community
coalitions. Our current moment, in which political and economic democracy
have come under severe stress, 363 eroding democratic norms in the United
States, 364 underscores the urgency of this power shift.
In asserting the value of labor localism for economic and political
democracy, I do not cast doubt on the primacy or desirability of federal and
state workplace regulation. 365 While decentralized workplace regulation is
not necessarily at odds with federal and state reform, 36 6 it is both narrower
359.

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (holding that the

codemaking authority conferred by Section 3 of the Recovery Act was an unconstitutional legislative

delegation).
360.

For an analysis of the relative merits of NIRA and the NLRA for unions, see Michael L.

Wachter, Labor Unions: A CorporatistInstitutionin a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 60107 (2007).
361.
This is similar to Catherine Fisk's argument that local hiring halls can form "the base from
which sectoral representation could grow." Fisk, supranote 213, at 30. This has been borne out in recent
state and local sectoral bargaining regimes for minimum wages and other work standards in Seattle,

Philadelphia, and Nevada, and a California bill proposed to create a fast-food board to promulgate wage
and hour and safety and health standards. Corbin Girnus, supranote 283 (describing sectoral bargaining

for home health workers in a Home Care Employment Board in NEV. S.B. 340); A.B. 257, 2021-2022
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021) (proposing Fast Food Sector Council).
362.
At time of writing, the United States House of Representatives passed the Build Back Better
Act ("BBB"), which would include a federal right to four weeks of paid family and medical leave and

authorize the NLRB to issue penalties for unfair labor practices. H.R. 5376, 117th Cong. (2021). BBB,
however, faces an uncertain future in the Senate. See Ewan Quayle, FutureofBuild Back Better Package
Uncertain After Manchin Refuses to Back It, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 20, 2021, 3:43 AM), https://www.news

week.com/joe-manchin-build-back-better-biden-live-updates-1660977 [https://perma.cc/9D6A-P57Q].
363. See supra Section LA; Andrias & Sachs, supranote 348, at 562-73.
364.
RAHMAN & GILMAN, supra note 31, at 69; McCartin, supranote 347, at 66.
365.
State-level minimum wage and sectoral bargaining laws have far greater reach than local
lawmaking. See NELP Report, supra note 113, at 4 (finding that Fight for Fifteen state minimum wage
campaigns lifted the wages of nearly sixteen million workers, while local minimum wage ordinances
covered only about two million workers). Likewise, an increase of the federal minimum wage would
broadly cover employees nationally notwithstanding current state and local minimum wage laws.
366.
Local workplace regulation can complement, and strengthen, workplace regulation by federal
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than state or federal reform and has limitations that preclude its use in many
sectors. 367 But, as explained in Section I.A, many weaknesses in labor and
employment law that labor localism seeks to address are entrenched,
longstanding features of federal and state law. Labor localism aims to
counteract these weaknesses by building political and workplace power
through cities. Its durable achievement is its transformation of how
subordinated groups view their own power to improve their lives, in their
workplaces and communities, through the democratic power of collective
action.

CONCLUSION
Economic inequality and weak labor and employment laws are
entrenched features of federal and state politics that are primarily responsive
to the interests of the affluent. Reversing the longstanding trend of declining
union membership and workplace rights will require worker participation in
a social movement that can overcome these barriers by building political and
workplace power. There are some signals that this has begun, fueled by
labor-community coalitions that seek out protests and bargaining in local
government. Decentralized workplace governance advances democratic
values and permits labor-community coalitions to engage the legal and
political structures of cities that facilitate public participation in local
lawmaking. Labor localism has increased the political power of and
delivered lasting economic gains to low-wage workers, immigrants, women,
and people of color. This Article has illuminated the positive and normative
implications of labor localism for state and local government law, as well as
for labor and employment law. It concludes that labor localism, in spite of
the preemption threat, is a principal staging ground for labor law reform and
a vital safeguard for economic and political democracy.

and state governments by developing local on-the-ground expertise and directing federal and state
capacity to meet local needs. See Fisk, supra note 213, at 23.
States regulate the collective bargaining rights of state and local employees, and often set
367.
education budgets, making state government a necessary site for #RedforEd advocacy. Oswalt, supra

note 10, at 113-17.
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